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ENVIRONMENTAL WATER RIGHTS: AN EVOLVING
CONCEPT OF PUBLIC PROPERTY

Lynda L. Butler*
From the world's water-poor areas to its water-rich regions,
countless conflicts have arisen over the appropriate allocation of
interests in water resources. These conflicts have occurred at all
levels of the political system, pitting nation against nation, state
against state, and locality against locality. 1 Although the disputes
generally involve one overriding question-who has the right to use
water-the legal issues involved in resolving that question span a
wide range of matters. 2 The longstanding and complex nature of
the disputes thus stands as a testament to the value and importance of water resources.
• Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary. B.S. 1973, College of William and Mary; J.D. 1978, University of Virginia.
Portions of this article are based on a speech entitled "Protection of Instream Uses: Public vs. Private Rights," which was presented May 19, 1989 at the Workshop. on Eastern
Water Law sponsored by the American Bar Association.
The author wishes to thank Diane Davis for her research assistance and Della Harris and
her staff for their able word processing skills.
' Water law treatises and articles provide ample evidence of these disputes. See 1 H.
Farnham, The Law of Waters and Water Rights preface at 1 (1904) (estimating the number
of court decisions involving water disputes to be about 17,000 as of 1904). See generally 2
Waters and Water Rights §§ 100-107, 130-134, 140-145, 150-152 (R. Clark ed. 1967 & Supp.
1978) (discussing federal/state relations, interstate stream conflicts, Indian water rights
claims, and international problems); 5 id. §§ 414, 430, 445 (discussing water rights determinations under the appropriation doctrine); Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in
a Riparian Jurisdiction: Defining the Relationship Between Public and Private Interests,
47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 95 (1985) (discussing consumptive water rights disputes arising in
America's riparian jurisdictions). American law has even developed separate legal doctrines
to govern the different types of disputes. See, e.g., id. at 134-36 (discussing the doctrin.e of
equitable apportionment developed by the United States Supreme Court to govern water
disputes between states). See generally A. Tarlock, Law of Water Rights and Resources
(1989) (explaining the law governing water allocation in the United States). Disputes over
water are not likely to decline in the future. See generally G.A. Res. 35/18, 35 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 48) at 101 (1980) (discussing the lack of access to safe and ample water supplies
and the lack of sanitation facilities existing in the world); 1987-1988 Council on Environmental Quality Ann. Rep. ch. 3 (discussing existing water conditions, programs, and recent
trends); 1 U.S. Water Resources Council, The Nation's Water Resources, 1975-2000 (1978)
(discussing America's increasing water use needs); Butler, supra, at 96-99 (describing water
supply problems facing the eastern United States).
• For example, disputes arising under the common law riparian doctrine, which traditionally has governed water allocation in the eastern United States, typically raise questions
about the reasonableness of a water use, about the area of land that can be benefitted by a
use, and about the transferability of water rights. See generally Butler, supra note 1, at 10556 (discussing these questions).
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Given the long history of water use conflict, it should not be surprising that man has found new grounds for dispute. Water uses
generally fall into one of two main categories. The first category,
out-of-stream or consumptive uses, involves those uses that require
the removal or diversion of water from a watercourse to the place
of use. Irrigation, stock watering, industrial water use, and residential use are examples of consumptive uses. 3 By contrast, the second
category, instream or nonconsumptive uses, does not require the
removal of water and refers instead to those benefits derived from
water while it is still flowing in the stream. Examples of instream
uses include navigation and recreational uses, as well as maintenance of water flows for aesthetic and ecological purposes. 4 While
the traditional focus of water disputes has been on private conflicts
involving competing consumptive uses, current disputes have
raised new issues and are shifting the focus away from purely private matters to tensions between public and private interests. Of
particular concern today are the conflicting interests of private
consumptive uses and public nonconsumptive needs.
As the demand for out-of-stream uses continues to rise, the need
for protection of instream uses has become increasingly apparent.
The survival of many aquatic and terrestrial species depends on
the instream flow, or the quantity of water flowing through a
stream. An adequate level of flowing water also is required to
maintain water quality and to prevent other drastic changes in the
physical characteristics of watercourses. Furthermore, people require adequate instream flows for recreational and aesthetic
purposes. 6
Despite the need for protection of instream uses, out-of-stream
uses have, for the most part, prevailed in both western and eastern
states. America's water allocation laws, which developed in the
context of the private property system, have made few, if any, accommodations for public interests. 6 Although government entities

See Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream
Uses, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 407, 407.
• See id.
• For a discussion of the benefits of instream flow, see 1 U.S. Water Resources Council,
supra note 1, at 42-47. See generally U.S. National Water Comm'n, Water Policies for the
Future 19-37 (1973) (discussing the environmental effects of water use) [hereinafter cited as
Water Policies]; Robie, Some Reflections on Environmental Considerations in Water
Rights Administration, 2 Ecology L.Q. 695, 710-21 (1972) (discussing environmental considerations relating to instream· use).
• See A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 5.02 (discussing the development of prior appropriation); Butler, supra note 1, at 105-56 (discussing the development of private consumptive
3
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generally have been able to meet public consumptive needs
through condemnation proceedings, innovative arrangements with
water rights holders, helpful statutory modifications, or aggressive
manipulation of common law principles,7 public nonconsumptive
needs have posed serious political, economic, and philosophical
problems. Recognition of nonconsumptive values raises difficult
questions about our political and economic structure and about the
ethical responsibilities of the citizenry.
For several decades, legal scholars and lawmakers have been exploring ways the law can recognize and promote the nonconsumptive needs of the public. 8 In recent years, their efforts have begun
to be realized as a growing number of courts and legislatures have
decided to protect instream uses with a wide variety of devices.
Some of these devices involve judicial interpretation or expansion
of common law doctrine, while others reflect changes in statutory
or administrative law. 9 Although the variety of the protective devices might suggest otherwise, they do share one common trait: all
represent an important step in the evolution of public property
rights in the environmental area. Gradually the law has begun to
recognize the legitimacy of public environmental water
rights-that is, public interests in environmental uses of water resources.10 Today, through the recent judicial and legislative
rights under riparianism).
7
In the eastern United States, accommodation of public consumptive needs has been a
particularly difficult process. While some eastern jurisdictions have modified their common
law water allocation systems by statute to provide for public consumptive needs, many
others have kept those systems basically intact. Government entities attempting to develop
public water supplies under eastern common law systems face a number of serious obstacles.
See generally Butler, supra note 1 (discussing those obstacles).
8 See, e.g., Water Policies, supra note 5, at 271-79; R. Freeman & F. Robinson, Opportunities to Protect Instream Flows in Vermont and Pennsylvania (Fish & Wildlife Service,
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, biological report 86(1), Apr. 1986); Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 233 (1980). See generally A.
Tarlock, supra note 1, §§ 8.01-.06 (discussing the development of public water use rights).
9
For further discussion of these judicial and legislative changes, see infra Parts II & III.
1
° For purposes of this article, the phrase "environmental uses of water resources" will
refer collectively to those uses that require the protection of the physical characteristics of
water resources-that is, those uses that require the maintenance of flow conditions. Among
other possibilities, environmental water uses will include the maintenance of instream flows
for navigational, ecological, aesthetic, and recreational purposes.
Under this definition, the phrase "environmental water use" is, for the most part, synonymous with instream use. But, though the two have considerable overlap, the phrase "environmental water use" has stronger environmental connotations. Whereas the phrase "environmental water use" stresses the relationship between instream use and the total
environment of a watercourse, instream use simply refers to any nonconsumptive use of
flowing water that produces a benefit.
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changes, that evolutionary process has reached the point where the
public interest needs to be recognized as a property right. Although such recognition would defy our system of private property,
public property rights are, in appropriate circumstances, needed as
a complement to private property. Many instream water uses raise
the types of concerns that both justify and necessitate public property rights.
To demonstrate the applicability of the public property concept
to instream uses, this article first describes the various forms of
instream protection that have developed under traditional and current law. Part I examines the relatively insignificant role of instream values under traditional water allocation systems, while
Parts II and III discuss the emerging forms of judicial and legislative protection, respectively. The focus of these discussions is not
to provide an exhaustive study of the various instream protection
programs, but rather to identify the current status, direction, and
limitations of the instream protection movement. Part IV then
suggests how the public property concept would help the evolution
of the public interest in environmental water uses.
I.

INSTREAM USES UNDER TRADITIONAL WATER ALLOCATION
SYSTEMS

Two main water allocation systems define the nature of rights
and interests in America's watercourses. One system, known as
riparianism, generally governs water rights in the eastern portion
of the United States. The second system, referred to as prior appropriation, prevails in the western part of the country. A brief
description of the two systems and of the status of instream values
under each one demonstrates the need for reform. 11 Although a
number of factors have contributed to this need, the private rights
perspective of traditional water allocation systems probably is the
primary reason why the traditional systems do not adequately protect the public's nonconsumptive interests. 12

11

For a more comprehensive discussion of the two systems, see A. Tarlock, supra note 1,
cbs. 3, 5.
" Another important factor is the judiciary's restrictive interpretation of common law
allocation principles. In many jurisdictions, the courts have been reluctant to redefine those
principles in light of changing needs and values. See generally Butler, supra note 1, at 10556 (discussing the restrictive approach of courts in riparian jurisdictions).
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A. Riparianism

Under the riparian doctrine, water rights in natural watercourses
arise as incidents to ownership of land abutting a watercourse. 13
Because many riparian landowners can be located along a watercourse, serious conflicts sometimes arise between users. Riparian
jurisdictions resolve those conflicts through one of two approaches:
the natural flow doctrine or the reasonable use rule. 14
The natural flow doctrine generally entitles each riparian proprietor to use the adjoining watercourse in its natural condition without perceptible interference by other users. 111 If a riparian is using
water for natural purposes, like drinking and other household purposes, then she may use as much water as necessary even though
the entire flow is depleted. But if a riparian is using water for artificial purposes-that is, for purposes not essential to life-then the
riparian may use the water only if he does not materially interfere
with the natural flow. 16
Although a 1982 study suggests otherwise, 17 the natural flow doctrine appears, in theory, to offer significant protection for instream
uses. 18 Indeed, some courts have applied the natural flow doctrine
to enjoin uses that cause excessive lowering of water levels. 19 Additionally, at least one court has applied the doctrine to enjoin a use
that prevented other riparians from boating and fishing and that
otherwise impaired the scenic value of their riverfront property. 20
As a practical matter, though, the natural flow doctrine will proba-

" Id. at 105. Under traditional law, water rights in lakes technically were known as littoral rights. Though the law governing these rights paralleled the riparian doctrine, different
terminology apparently was necessitated by a restrictive definition of watercourse which excluded lakes. See 2 H. Farnham, supra note 1, § 458; 5 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property
~ 709 [2][b][iv) (1990); 1A G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property §§ 256, 259, 265, 280 (1980 & Supp. 1981). Modern commentators define a watercourse
more broadly to include lakes. See, e.g., A. Tarlock, supra note 1, §§ 3.05[1], 3.06[2]. Today,
then, riparian rights would attach to lakes as well as streams. See id. § 3.05[1], at 3-13.
•• Ausness, supra note 3, at 416.
16
!d. See generally A. Tarlock, supra note 1, §§ 3.12[1], [2] (discussing early and current
theories of natural flow).
" Ausness, supra note 3, at 416.
11
See Davis, The Riparian Right of Streamflow Protection in the Eastern States, 36
Ark. L. Rev. 47 (1982). The study summarily dismisses a few cases that relied on the natural
flow doctrine to protect recreational use, noting that the cases no longer are " viable precedent." !d. at 55. The study also notes that riparian caselaw historically has ignored ecological instream uses. !d. at 72.
•• Accord A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 3.12[2); Ausness, supra note 3, at 417.
•• See, e.g., Dardenne Realty Co. v. Abeken, 232 Mo. App. 945, 106 S.W.2d 966 (1937).
20
See Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967).
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bly have little effect on the promotion of instream values; currently, most riparian jurisdictions follow the second approach to
resolving use conflicts.21
The reasonable use rule entitles each riparian proprietor to make
reasonable uses of the adjoining watercourse for the benefit of her
riparian land.22 Under this rule, a riparian's rights are not absolute,
for other riparians along the same watercourse also have an
"equal" right to make reasonable uses of water. 23 Whether a use is
reasonable depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular
case. A use that initially is reasonable may become unreasonable
over time. Factors considered by the courts in evaluating a use's
reasonableness include normal stream conditions, the purpose of
the use, and the compatibility of the use with other uses. In evaluating a conflict, the courts tend to prefer domestic uses, such as
drinking, bathing, and cooking. 24
The few cases that have applied the reasonable use standard to
recreational or similar instream uses suggest that private instream
uses can find protection under the reasonable use rule. 211 In a 1955
Arkansas case, for example, the court concluded that the defendant's pumping operations unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs' use of a lake for fishing, recreation, and other lawful purposes.26 These cases, however, are not true public rights cases.
Although the courts may have protected instream use, the party
conducting the use sought protection as a private riparian proprietor. The courts, in other words, have not used the reasonable use
rule to recognize public rights in instream uses.
In conclusion, the riparian doctrine provides some protection for
instream uses. Under both the natural flow doctrine and the reasonable use rule, instream uses theoretically would seem to receive
as much protection as consumptive uses. As a practical matter,
though, the riparian doctrine's protection of instream uses is limited. Because the doctrine traditionally only recognizes private use
rights, the public interest in instream uses is protected only to the
•• See Ausness, supra note 3, at 417.
n See Butler, supra note 1, at 105-06. See generally A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 3.12[4]
(discussing the development of the reasonable use rule).
u Butler, supra note 1, at 106.
•• !d. at 126-27.
26
See Ausness, supra note 3, at 417-18 (discussing Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283
S.W.2d 129 (1955); Callens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967);
Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1950)).
36
Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
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extent that it coincides with private rights. Furthermore, for the
public to benefit, a private riparian must be willing to enforce his
instream use rights through litigation. Due to the high costs of litigation and the relatively intangible benefits of instream uses, it is
doubtful that many riparians would have sufficient economic incentive to enforce instream rights. 27

B. Prior Appropriation '
Under the prior appropriation system, a water user who first diverts water from a watercourse and uses it for a beneficial purpose
acquires rights superior to subsequent users. Unlike riparian
rights, appropriative rights are not restricted to waterfront landowners; nor do appropriative rights have to benefit riparian land.
The protection that the doctrine can offer to instream uses, however, is limited in other ways. To avoid losing her rights, for instance, an appropriator must not only claim, but also use, a definite quantity of water. Moreover, because of its historical and legal
development, the prior appropriation system favors consumptive
uses over instream uses. 28
Historically courts following the prior appropriation doctrine
have disfavored instream uses because of the beneficial use requirement. Under a traditional interpretation of that requirement,
instream uses are inherently wasteful since they require water to
remain i.n place and therefore reduce the water available for consumptive uses. 29 Over time, however, courts have become more receptive to instream uses. Several courts, for example, have recognized fishing and recreation as beneficial uses. 30
Courts in prior appropriation jurisdictions have also disfavored
instream uses because of the doctrine's actual diversion requireAusness, supra note 3, at 418. Compare id. (where the author doubts the ability of the
riparian system to protect public instream values) with Davis, supra note 17, at 80 (where
the author concludes that courts in riparian jurisdictions seem to be willing to protect flows
for recreational instream use and that no precedents inhibit extending such a right to the
public for recreational and natural habitat uses).
•• Ausness, supra note 3, at 418-19. See generally A. Tarlock, supra note 1, §§ 5.02-.03
(discussing the development of the different theories of prior appropriation). Though a riparian land restriction does not apply, some appropriation jurisdictions are beginning to impose a watershed limitation. Such a limitation would provide some protection for instream
uses. See id. § 5.11.
•• See Ausness, supra note 3, at 419-20.
•• See, e.g., State ex ret. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182
P.2d 421 (1945). See generally A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 5.16 (discussing the beneficial use
requirement).
07
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ment. 31 Under this requjrement, a user must physically divert
water from a watercourse in order to perfect an appropriation. Apparently the courts have imposed this requirement to prevent a
single party from successfully claiming appropriative rights to an
entire stream when that party was not actually using all of the
stream's flow. In addition, the requirement helps to ensure that
other water users have notice of a new user's claim. 32 Under a
strict interpretation of the actual diversion requirement, instream
uses would not be protected since they do not, by definition, involve a diversion. A more liberal interpretation, however, might
protect instream appropriations if the appropriator could establish
that she had acquired physical control of the water. Although an
actual diversion would be one way of establishing such control, an
instream appropriator also could acquire physical control by impounding the water or by becoming the owner of the banks of the
watercourse. 33 But even under the more liberal approach, the actual diversion requirement still can limit the effectiveness of instream protection measures. 34
Like riparian jurisdictions, then, traditional prior appropriation
states offer little hope to those seeking recognition of the public
interest in instream use. Even more so than its eastern counterpart, the prior appropriation doctrine incorporates the private consumptive perspective into its legal requirements. Protection of instream values thus has required, and continues to require,
deliberate changes to the traditional water allocation system. Regardless of whether the changes occur by judicial or legislative action, they must provide affirmative recognition of the public interest in order to overcome the private perspective of traditional law.
II.

JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF INSTREAM USES

Over the years, several different techniques for protecting mSee Ausness, supra note 3, at 420.
/d.
33
See Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 598-602, 153
Cal. Rptr. 518, 524-26 (1979). Although commentators have concluded that modern permit
statutes make the actual diversion requirement obsolete, see, e.g., A. Tarlock, supra note 1,
§ 5.15, some prior appropriation jurisdictions still enforce the requirement. See Ausness,
supra note 3, at 420.
34
See, e.g., Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 599, 603,
153 Cal. Rptr. 518, 524, 527 (1979) (where the court concluded that, without express legislative action, it must deny an instream appropriation application when the applicant failed to
establish physical activity or control sufficient to meet the more liberal diversion
requirement).
31

32

1990]

Environmental Water Rights

331

stream values have evolved through the courts. One technique involves the use of the public trust doctrine to limit the exercise of
consumptive water rights. A second technique concerns an expansion of the navigability concept to include instream values. A third
uses the federal reserved water rights doctrine to legitimate instream values. A fourth involves interpreting environmental provisions in state constitutions as imposing a duty of environmental
protection. Though the techniques differ, each reflects a commitment to the public interest not generally present under traditional
water law. The techniques thus represent an important step in the
evolution of public property rights.
A. Expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine recognizes that certain resources, principally navigable waters and their submerged beds, are held by
each state in trust for the benefit of its citizens. 36 Developed in
large part by the United States Supreme Court, the public trust
doctrine prevents states from totally abdicating their trust responsibilities or from substantially impairing the public interest in
trust resources. 36 The United States Supreme Court, for example,
applied the doctrine to invalidate an Illinois statute granting a significant portion of the bed of Lake Michigan to a railroad company. 37 The Court explained that the state's abdication of its ownership interests in the valuable submerged lands was "a gross
perversion of the trust over the property."38
Under the public trust doctrine, resources are impressed with
the trust in order to protect the public's right to the enjoyment of
certain uses. Courts traditionally have defined public trust uses as
including navigation, commerce, and sometimes fishing and the operation of public sewage systems. 39 In recent years, some courts
have expanded the doctrine to include uses like environmental
preservation, swimming, bathing, and other recreational purposes.40 In New Jersey, for example, the ·courts have extended the
•• See L. Butler & M. Livingston, Virginia Tidal and Coastal Law 105 (1988). See generally id. ch. 5 (discussing the evolution of the doctrine).
•• See generally id. § 5.2.A (discussing the emergence of the public trust doctrine in the
United States Supreme Court).
37
Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
•• ld. at 455.
•• See, e.g., id. at 452; Mayor of Newark v. Sayre, 60 N.J. Eq. 361, 369-70, 45 A. 985, 98788 (1900); State ex rei. Rohrer v. Credle, 369 S.E.2d 825, 828 (N.C. 1988).
40
See generally L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, § 5.2 (discussing judicial per-
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public trust to recreational uses of beach areas, even those that are
man-made. 41 Similarly, in California and Mississippi, the courts
have concluded that valid public trust purposes include recreational pursuits, environmental protection, and the enhancement of
aquatic and marine life. 42 As one court explained, the public trust
is not a static concept, but rather evolves with the times as the
needs and values of the people change.' 3
Despite this type of expansive language in judicial opinions, only
a few court decisions have directly applied the public trust doctrine to protect instream uses." In one of those decisions, United
Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Commission,' 6 the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded
that the doctrine applied to state waters and obligated state officials to consider the impact of proposed allocations of water resources on the public trust.' 6 The controversy in United
Plainsmen focused on the issuance of future water permits for
coal-related power and energy production facilities. Plaintiff
sought an injunction against the issuance of those permits until
state officials developed adequate short-term and long-term plans
for the conservation and development of the state's natural resources. To support its request, plaintiff pointed to statutory provisions defining state water policy.47 Plaintiff argued that the provisions imposed mandatory planning responsibilities on state
officials and that those responsibilities had to be met prior to the
issuance of the water permits. The trial court disagreed, dismissing
the claim.
spectives on the public trust doctrine).
•• See Lusardi v. Curtis Point Property Owners Ass'n, 86 N.J. 217, 227-32, 430 A.2d 881,
886·88 (1981); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 178-81, 393 A.2d 571, 573-74
(1978); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 301-10, 294
A.2d 47, 54-55 (1972). For further discussion of New Jersey's handling of the public trust
doctrine, see L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, § 5.2.C.
42
See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971);
Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
•• Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub nom.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U,S. 469 (1988).
44
See Ausness, supra note 3, at 421.
•• 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
•• See id. at 462.
47
Among other matters, the statutory provisions declared that state water resources policy included the" 'execution and periodic updating of comprehensive, coordinated and wellbalanced short- and long-term plans and programs for the conservation and development' "
of state waters. ld. at 459 (quoting the statutory provisions).
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In concluding that the complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, the North Dakota Supreme Court looked to
constitutional and statutory principles and to the general policies
of the public trust doctrine. The court rejected the plaintiff's interpretation of statutory law, explaining that the provisions were, at
best, "a significant advisory policy statement."48 But the court did
agree with plaintiff that "the discretionary authority of state officials to allocate vital state resources" is limited by the public trust
doctrine. 49 As the court explained, the public trust doctrine is "assuming an expanding role in environmental law."~ 0 At a minimum
the doctrine requires "evidence of some planning by appropriate
state ... [officials] in the allocation of public water resources."M
Such planning should include "a determination of the potential effect of the allocation of water" on the present and future water
needs of the state. 112
In a decision similar to United Plainsmen, the Supreme Court of
California decided that the public trust doctrine provides an independent basis for reviewing and evaluating water allocation decisions. The California decision, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 113 involved a dispute over the
diversion of water from Mono Lake by the City of Los Angeles.
The diversions had resulted in significant ecological changes in
Mono Lake. Besides losing one-third of its surface area, the lake
had experienced a drop in its water level and a change in its living
resources. 114 Plaintiffs filed suit to enjoin the diversion, arguing that
the diversion's adverse environmental consequences impermissibly
impaired the public trust interest in the shores, beds, and waters
of Mono Lake.
In agreeing that the public trust doctrine applies to California's
appropriative water rights system, the court rejected the argument
that the system had subsumed the trust doctrine. The court explained that both the public trust doctrine and the water alloca•• /d. at 460.
•• !d.
00
!d. at 463.
01 !d.
•• !d. at 462.
03
33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied sub nom. City of Los
Angeles Department of Water & Power v. National Audubon Society, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
•• See id. at 429-31, 658 P.2d at 715-16, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 352-53 (discussing the environmental consequences of the diversions)_
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tion system "embody important precepts."55 Embracing one set of
principles and rejecting the other would lead to unbalanced resource decisions. A better accommodation would result, in the
court's view, by interpreting the trust doctrine as imposing a continuing and affirmative duty on the state to consider public trust
interests in making water allocation decisions. Under the doctrine
the state owed a duty, as trustee, to consider the effect of proposed
water allocations on the public trust and to " preserve, so far as
consistent with the public interest, the uses protected by the
trust." 116 Although the court did not define this duty more specifically, it did focus on certain factors throughout its opinion. Among
others, those factors included the effect of a proposed use on the
physical and chemical characteristics of the affected area, the use's
impact on fisheries, wildfowl, and other natural communities, and
the impact on the health of nearby residents. 117
Both United Plainsmen and National Audubon establish that
the public trust doctrine applies to the water allocation process,
requiring consideration of the impact of allocation decisions on the
public interest. This use of the public trust doctrine is not, however, a problem-free solution for protecting instream values. A recent decision indicates, for example, that North Dakota's trust obligations with respect to water allocations are not that difficult to
meet. In Bottineau County Water Resource District v. North Dakota Wildlife Society, 118 the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the state did not violate the public trust doctrine by
granting drainage permits to Bottineau County. As the court explained, United Plainsmen only stated that the doctrine required
"'controlled development of resources rather than no development.' " 59 In the Bottineau County controversy, opponents and
supporters of the drainage permits had extensively studied and debated the possible consequences of the permits. Moreover, the
state's decisionmaking process had included detailed analysis and
discussion of the potential impacts. Thus, the court had no difficulty concluding that the state had adequately protected the public trust interest. 60

•• /d. at 445, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
•• /d. at 446-47, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
07
See id. at 428-31, 434-36, 447-48, 658 P.2d at 714-16, 719-20, 729, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 35153, 356·57, 365-66.
•• 424 N.W.2d 894 (N.D. 1988).
•• /d. at 903 (quoting from United Plainsmen).
60 /d.
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Furthermore, some commentators have speculated that the effect of United Plainsmen will not be as great as National Audubon. They explain that, in contrast to the California court, the
North Dakota Supreme Court has attempted to rely on preexisting
constitutional and statutory principles to · justify its decision instead of recognizing the public trust obligation as independent of
constitutional and statutory law. 61 To the extent that other courts
agree with this approach, public trust protection for instream values would be available only where states have constitutional and
statutory provisions similar to North Dakota,s.
Additional problems are posed by judicial application of the
public trust doctrine to instream uses. Neither United Plainsmen
nor National Audubon, for example, clearly defines the type of interest protected by the public trust doctrine. At best, only vague
guidelines are provided by the two courts. One of those guidelines
is that ecological water uses qualify as a public trust interest.
Other jurisdictions have been even less direct in defining the relationship between the public trust doctrine and the water allocation
process. Still, an increasing number of courts are at least demonstrating a willingness to accept the general applicability of the
trust concept to ecological values. 62 Because this general tenet is at
the core of the National Audubon and United Plainsmen decisions, instream protection through the water allocation process
may not be far behind.
Extending the public trust doctrine to protect instream uses also
raises many difficult questions. Jurisdictions following National
Audubon, for instance, will have to define the appropriate public
trust criteria for evaluating water allocation decisions, as well as
the role of courts and agencies in applying the criterla. 63 In addition, these jurisdictions will have to decide how the protections accorded instream uses under the trust doctrine relate to statutory
protections built into the water allocation system. 64 Decisions like
61

See Ausness, supra note 3, at 427-28; Walston, The Implications of the Public Trust
Doctrine for State Water Rights Administration, Prac. Real Est. Law. 47, 54 (July 1985).
•• See, e.g., CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118 & n.8, 1121 n.15 (Alaska
1988) (where the court limited its decision to the traditionally recognized fishery interest
but then cited with approval the National Audubon decision); Orion Corp. v. State, 109
Wash. 2d 621, 641 & n.lO, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 & n.10 (1987) (where the court broadly
interpreted the public trust doctrine to include recreational interests and cited with approval a California case extending the public trust to ecological values), cert. denied 486
u.s. 1022 (1988).
•• Walston, supra note 61, at 55, 56.
64
See id. at 55.
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National Audubon also create uncertainty for holders of water
rights. To be efficient, a water allocation system must provide security to those holders. sG Because National Audubon indicates that
the state has a continuing obligation to consider the public trust
interest, state officials apparently have the power and the obligation to reevaluate and, where appropriate, to modify water allocation decisions. 66
On a more positive note, the public trust doctrine provides a potentially broad basis for protecting instream uses. Most states traditionally have used their police powers or express constitutional
powers to justify regulating private property rights for the public
good. Under their police powers, states generally may adopt reasonable regulations in the interest of the public health, welfare,
and safety without violating the constitutional rights of private
property owners affected by the regulations and thus without having to compensate the property owners. 67 But where a regulation
does not promote these ends or unreasonably interferes with the
use rights or investment-backed expectations of a property owner,
the government may have to provide compensation to the owner to
avoid a conflict with the takings clause of the federal Constitution.68 Because the public trust theory recognizes that certain public rights arise from a sovereign's interests in navigable waters,
these rights arguably limit, instead of regulate, private property
rights. Under this interpretation the private rights would be inherently subordinate to the public rights and could be impaired, without compensation, by state conduct designed to promote the public
rights. 69
86

See generally R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 3.1 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing the
need to reward investment and promote efficiency by recognizing property rights); Butler,
supra note 1, at 130-37 (discussing the need to clarify riparian water rights and eliminate
some of their uncertainty).
66
Accord Ausness, supra note 3, at 428.
•• See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); R. Epstein, Takings
107-12 (1985). For a comprehensive discussion of the police power, see E. Freund, The Police Power (1904).
88
See Nollan
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-36 (1987); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978). See generally Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1183-1201 (1967) (discussing some of the key takings tests
developed by the courts).
80
For further discussion of the relationship between the public trust doctrine and the
takings clause, see L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, § 20.2.A.2.

v.
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B. Expansion of the Definition of Navigability

For historical reasons, the American legal system has distinguished between public and private waters in recognizing public
water use rights. 70 Much of that distinction, in turn, has focused on
the concept of navigability. 71 Under the English common law, the
courts generally defined public waters as those waters that supported commercial navigation.72 Waters meeting this standard
were, for the most part, subject to public navigation, commerce,
and, in the view of some historians, fishing. 73 American courts have
similarly relied on the navigability concept to recognize public
rights in water resources. As explained earlier, the concept serves
as one of the traditional bases of the public trust doctrine, which is
now an important and independent source of public water use
rights. 74 Additionally, in the early 1800s, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the commerce clause of the federal Constitution as incorporating the navigability concept. 711 Under this interpretation, the commerce clause empowers Congress to keep
navigable waters "open and free" 76 and thus subjects those waters
to a federal navigation servitude. The constitutional basis of the
servitude serves, then, as a source . of the federal government's
70

See A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 8.02[1], at 8-2.
Other factors used to identify "public waters" include the nature of the sovereign inter·
est in submerged beds and the existence of waste lands underlying tidal waters. See id. §
8.02[2]. Government ownership of submerged beds traditionally entitles the public to use
overlying waters. /d. § 8.02[2J[a]. Furthermore, if the beds are beneath tidal waters, the
beds are presumed, under the common law, to be waste lands owned by the sovereign. /d. §
8.02[2][b). Neither factor, however, is a necessary condition for the recognition of public
rights. See id. § 8.02[2].
72
/d. § 9.03[1][a).
73
See id. § 8.02[2)(a], at 8·4. See generally L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, §
5.l.B (discussing public rights under English law).
74
See supra notes 35-39, 68-69 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the
theoretical bases of the public trust doctrine, see L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35,
§ 5.1.
76
In the 1824 decision Gibbons u. Ogden, the Court declared that the commerce clause
"comprehends navigation, within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with 'commerce with foreign nations, or among the
several States, or with the Indian tribes.'" 22 U.S. (19 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824). Before making
this declaration; the Court observed the link between the commerce clause and prior understandings and practices. After noting that the federal government had controlled navigation
since "the commencement of the government," the Court stated: "All America understands,
and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce,' to comprehend navigation.... The
power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the
people of America adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in forming
it.'' /d. at 190.
76
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 404-05 (1940).
71
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power to regulate navigable waters and related resources. In addition, as a product of the common law, the federal navigation servitude generally entitles the public to a right of passage in navigable
waters. 77
The meaning of the navigability concept has gradually expanded
over time as the functions of the concept and the powers and responsibilities of the government have increased. Under a traditional definition of the concept, a watercourse is navigable if the
public uses or can use the watercourse, in its ordinary condition,
for commerce. 78 Although the traditional definition still governs
the allocation of title to submerged beds between federal and state
governments, it no longer defines the full scope of the federal government's regulatory powers over water resources. 79 Nor does it
fully define the scope of the public's interests in navigable waters.
It does not control, for example, the question of the public's water
use rights under state law. As long as their decisions do not conflict
with superior federal law, state courts are free to make their own
determinations of public rights under the navigability concept and
other theories.80
Accordingly, some state c~mrts have expanded the concept of
navigability to include a functional approach to defining public
water use rights. These courts have rejected the traditional test as
the only definition of navigability and have adopted an additional
test based on recreational or public use. 81 Under this new approach, a watercourse that is not navigable in fact for commercial

See A. Tarlock, supra note 1, §§ 8.02[1], 9.03[1)[a]. See generally id. § 9.04 (discus... ing
the navigation servitude). A state navigation servitude may also exist. See id. § 3.17[3).
•• See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). See generally 1A G. Thompson, supra note 13, § 258 (discussing the meaning of navigability).
79
See A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 9.03[1)[b]. See generally id. § 9.03[1][c] (discussing the
expansion of the federal definition of navigability). Under common law, the states became
the owners of the beds beneath navigable waters when the American Revolution took place.
See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842); A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 8.02[3).
The traditional navigability test generally is used to identify navigable waters for the purpose of determining state ownership of beds. See id. §§ 8.02[1], 8.03[1]. Once state ownership of beds initially is determined, state law then basically governs the allocation of title to
beds between private parties and the state. See id. §§ 8.03[2], 8.05(1].
80
See A. Tarlock, supra note 1, §§ 8.02, 8.05. See generally id. § 9.05 (discussing federal
preemption of state water law).
•• See, e.g., Arkansas v. Mcilroy, 268 Ark. 227, 234-37, 595 S.W.2d 659, 663-65, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P .2d
163, 169-71 (Mont. 1984); Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 935 (Okla. 1969). Some jurisdictions
have rejected the recreational boating test. See, e.g., People v. Emmert, 198 Colo. 137, 597
P.2d 1025 (1979); Lakeside Park Co. v. Forsmark, 396 Pa. 389, 153 A.2d 486 (1959). See
generally A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 8.05[2) (discussing the recreational use test).
77
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purposes may nevertheless be navigable for purposes of recognizing
recreational and other instream rights if the watercourse may be
used for those purposes. 82 Courts adopting the recreational use
definition explain that the navigability concept serves a variety of
functions and that the meaning of navigability should vary accordingly. Courts explain further that, because the commercial use test
controls the question of title and developed before recreational
uses became important, the traditional test should not be interpreted to preclude a recreational use approach. 83
Some commentators have interpreted the recreational use cases
as public trust decisions rather than as navigability cases having
independent legal significance. 84 Although the language of a few
opinions supports this view, 811 the two concepts have somewhat different meanings and implications. One important difference is that
the public trust doctrine is self-executing, while the federal navigation servitude is not. 86 Over one hundred years ago, the United
States Supreme Court concluded that the federal navigation servitude did not, by itself, prevent actions that impair navigation. The
navigation servitude merely authorized Congress to pass legislation
to protect the federal interest in navigation. But without legislation, no federal common law existed to protect that interest. 87 The
public trust doctrine, in contrast, does protect the public interest
in trust resources even in the absence of protective legislation.
Only a few years after deciding that there was no federal common
law to protect the navigation servitude, the United States Supreme
Court concluded that the trust doctrine-a common law concept-could be used to invalidate state action that impaired the

82
See Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170 (Mont.
1984).
83
See, e.g., id.; cf. A. Tarlock, supra note 1. § 8.02[1] (discussing the different functions
of the navigability concept).
8
' See Ausness, supra note 3, at 434.
86
See, e.g., Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512, 515 (Miss. 1986)
(taking a broad approach to public trust purposes and discussing those purposes in the context of the navigability concept), aff'd sub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484
U.S. 469 (1988); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170-71
(Mont. 1984) (discussing recreational use in the context of the public trust doctrine and the
navigability concept).
88
Walston, supra note 61, at 48.
87
See Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 8 (1888). Since that decision,
Congress has enacted numerous statutes to protect and promote the navigation servitude.
See generally A. , Tarlock, supra note 1, ch. 9 (discussing federal regulation of water
resources).
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public trust. 88 Thus, to the extent that courts tie the recreational
use test to the federal navigation servitude,89 protection of public
recreational rights would require legislative action. Public recreational rights based on the public trust doctrine, in contrast, could
receive judicial protection in the absence of legislative action regardless of the theoretical origins attributed to the doctrine.
A second difference concerns the scope of the two concepts. As
explained earlier, some courts have concluded that the public trust
concept is nonstatic and changes with the times. Because the notion of stewardship is inherent in the public trust doctrine, taking
a flexible approach to defining the scope of the doctrine permits a
court to extend the doctrine to new stewardship concerns like ecological preservation and other instream uses. The navigation servitude, in contrast, tends to be less adaptable and more focused in
scope. Thus, even when a court is willing to extend the definition
of navigability to include recreational use, it does not necessarily
follow that the court will define recreational use to include ecological values. 90
In conclusion, use of an expanded navigability concept to protect
instream values appears to suffer more inherent limitations than
similar use of the public trust doctrine. As long as the public interest is tied to the federal navigation servitude, the protection afforded instream uses under the navigability concept will depend on
legislative action. Furthermore, even if the public interest is independent of the navigation servitude, the narrower, more focused
scope of the navigability concept still may limit the utility of the
concept in the instream context. Except in the more liberal jurisdictions, public instream interests will be limited to uses related to
commercial or recreational navigation .
88

See Illinois Centraf R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1893).
The United States Supreme Court's early incorporation of the navigability concept into
the commerce clause would explain such a link. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
State courts are often vague in their descriptions of the origins of public water rights and
the functions being served by the navigability concept. See, e.g., Montana cases cited infra
note 156. The courts' vagueness is understandable given the variety of theories supporting
public rights. S ee generally A. Tarlock, supra note 1, ch. 8 (discussing the nature, scope,
and origins of public water use rights). Additionally, even those states adopting the recreational use test vary in their approach to public recreational rights. Some courts appear to
limit public interests to uses necessarily related to recreational navigation, while others recognize virtually any interest incidental to navigational activity. See infra note 153.
90
Accord Ausness, supra note 3, at 434-35; cf. infra note 153 (discussing the different
judicial approaches to recreational use). See generally L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra
note 35, §§ 5.1, 5.3, 6.3.8 (discussing the philosophical origins and normative implications of
the public trust doctrine).
.

89
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The Federal Reserved Water Rights Doctrine

Under the federal reserved water rights doctrine, courts have interpreted government action that withdraws lands from the public
domain and sets them aside for a particular purpose as reserving
water to carry out that purpose. 91 Depending on the language used
in the government withdrawal, the courts may base their conclusion on an express or implied intent. 92 When an express reservation exists, the judicial decision is usually simple and straightforward.93 Implied intent cases, on the other hand, are more
controversial, often resulting in disagreement about the legitimacy
and meaning of implied rights. 94 Some recent cases have developed
a primary, as opposed to secondary, purpose test. 95 In Sierra Club
v. Block,96 for example, a United States district court concluded
that the federal Wilderness Act impliedly reserved federal water
rights in previously unappropriated water. 97 As the court explained, Congress intended the protection of watersheds and the
preservation of water flows to be a primary purpose of the Wilderness Act. Accomplishing this purpose would require the reservation
of water rights. 98
Decisions like Sierra Club are significant because they legitimate
certain instream uses that state law might not otherwise protect.
In addition, under the federal reserved water rights doctrine, protected instream uses generally acquire priority over state water
rights at the time when the reservation of federal land occurred,
not when the water use began. This priority date is earlier than the
date typically set by state law. 99 Although the earlier priority date
benefits instream uses protected under the reserved water rights
doctrine, this consequence of the doctrine creates uncertainty for
existing water users. 100
See generally Trelease, Uneasy Federalism - State Water Laws and National Water
Uses, 55 Wash. L. Rev. 751 (1980).
90
See generally A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 9.08 (discussing non-Indian federal reserved
water rights). To the extent that court interpretations reflect an express legislative intent,
the federal reserved water rights doctrine would more appropriately be characterized as a
legislative form of instream protection.
93
See id. § 9.08[2], at 9-49 to -50 (discussing one such example).
$• See id. at 9-50.
n See generally id. § 9.08[2) (discussing the implied intent cases).
98
622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985).
97
/d. at 858-62.
98 /d.
8
$ See Trelease, supra note 91, at 756.
100
See id. at 762-63. See generally Trelease, supra note 91 (criticizing the federal re91
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D. Protection Through Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutional Provisions
Some state courts have interpreted generally worded environmental provisions in their state constitutions as imposing a duty of
environmental protection obligating state officials to consider environmental impact. 101 In Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Commission/ 02 for example, the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted state constitutional and statutory law as
imposing a duty of environmental protection on all state officials
and agencies. 103 The Louisiana case involved a challenge to an
agency's decision to issue permits for the construction and operation of a hazardous waste disposal facility. The Louisiana Constitution has, for years, contained a general environmental provision
declaring that the "natural resources of the state, including air and
water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of
the environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare
of the people. " 104 The provision then authorizes the legislature to
"enact laws to implement" the provision's policy. 106
Under the court's interpretation, the constitutional provision required state agencies and officials to determine, prior to approval
of proposed action, whether "adverse environmental impacts have
been minimized or avoided as much as possible consistently with
the public welfare. " 106 As the court explained, this obligation required a balancing of environmental costs and benefits with economic, social, and other factors. 107 Courts reviewing substantive
decisions reached through this balancing process were not to reverse a decision unless the actual balance reached by the agency
was "arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental
protection."108 Because the agency record under review did notreveal whether the agency even recognized its constitutional obliga-

served and nonreserved water rights doctrines).
101
See generally Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political Influence
and Regulatory Failure, 31 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. , part l.B (1990) (discussing the role of
environmental provisions in state constitutions).
102
452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
103
Id. at 1154-55, 1156-58.
10
• La. Canst. art. IX, § 1.
10. !d.
108
Save Ourselves, Inc., 452 So. 2d at 1157.
107
!d. at 1160.
108
!d. at 1159.
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tions, the matter was remanded for further consideration.
The theory behind a decision like Save Ourselves represents another step in the evolution of public property rights in environmental resources. Agencies are required, in effect, to recognize a
public interest that the state cannot abridge without providing a
measure of process. Instream uses that raise environmental preservation concerns theoretically, then, should receive some constitutional protection. 109 This movement towards recognition of public
property rights, however, is limited in the amount of protection it
actually affords to instream values. In practice, the protection may
be very superficial and limited given the low standard of judicial
review. Furthermore, a substantial number of courts have disagreed with the Louisiana court and have refused to interpret general environmental provisions in their state constitution as imposing a mandatory duty on state officials. 110 In a 1985 decision, for
example, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that a constitutional provision similar in wording to the Louisiana provision did
not mandate action by state officials. To rule otherwise would, in
the court's view, raise too many unanswered questions. Thus, absent legislative direction, the constitutional provision remained a
nonbinding policy statement.I 11
To summarize, the protective techniques developed through the
judicial process represent important steps in the evolution of a
concept of public property rights in environmental resources. Each
of the techniques has the potential to afford some protection to the
public's instream needs. At this stage of the evolutionary process,
however, it is evident that no overriding theory has, as of yet, been
clearly articulated. Although the techniques help to legitimate the
public interest in instream use, they, at best, represent scattered
attempts to protect instream values. Without the development of
some overriding theory, the judicial techniques will continue to be
limited in the amount of protection each independently can
provide.

109
For a discussion of how courts can enforce environmental provisions in state constitutions even when legislative direction is missing, see Butler, supra note 101, part I.B.2.

See id. part I.B (introductory paragraphs).
Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 228 Va. 678, 324 S.E.2d 674 (1985). For further discussion of Virginia's approach to its constitutional provision, see Butler, supra note 101, part
I.B.l.
110
111
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LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION OF INSTREAM USES

In addition to judicial protection, instream uses have received
statutory protection in a growing number of jurisdictions. Legislative protection of instream uses takes a number of different forms.
They include statutory modification of the traditional water allocation doctrines, minimum flow legislation, and enactment of programs providing indirect protection for instream values. Each of
the different forms of legislative protection represents a recognition of the validity of public interests in water resources. The diverse treatment of public interests under the various programs also
demonstrates, however, that, like judicial techniques, the legislative programs lack a coherent central theory.
Statutory
Doctrines
A.

Modification

of

the

Traditional

Allocation

Legislatures generally have pursued two key options in modifying their traditional water allocation systems to protect the public
interest in nonconsumptive uses. These options are direct statutory recognition of instream water rights and the incorporation of a
public interest standard into the water allocation process. Of the
two approaches, the first represents a clearer political choice and
thus should produce more effective protection of the public interest in instream water use.
1. Recognition of Instream Water Rights

A number of prior appropriation jurisdictions have modified
their water rights systems by statutorily recognizing instream
water rights. In Idaho and Colorado, for example, state agencies
can obtain the right to appropriate water for instream uses. The
Idaho legislation identifies waters where instream appropriations
are allowed, while the Colorado provisions allow an administrative
agency to make that determination. Both instream programs recognize the appropriation of water for environmental preservation
as a beneficial use.112
m See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 37-92-102(3), 37-92-103(4) (1973 & Supp. 1989); Idaho Code§§
67-4301, -4304, -4307 to -4312 (1989). At least one state even allows private parties to make
instream appropriations. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-151 (1987). Some commentators
have criticized the recognition of private instream appropriations. See, e.g., A. Tarlock,
supra note 1, § 5.07[3].
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These two instream appropriation programs have already faced
unsuccessful legal challenges. 113 In one such challenge, 114 the Colorado Supreme Court upheld statutory provisions allowing the state
to appropriate such waters of natural streams and lakes as may be
required "to preserve the .natural environment to a reasonable degree."1111 Opponents of the program had claimed that any instream
appropriation for recreational and ecological purposes would be invalid because of the absence of an actual diversion. They also argued that the statutory provisions authorizing instream appropriations were constitutionally infirm. In rejecting these arguments,
the Colorado Supreme Court held that under state law an instream
appropriation did not need to include an actual diversion and that
the challenged provisions were not void for vagueness nor otherwise invalid under the state Constitution. The court explained that
the state's minimum flow legislation clearly intended appropriations without diversions. 116 In addition, the court noted that the
presumption of valid agency action "must stand in the absence of
evidence that there is no rational connection between preservation
of existing fish species ... by minimum stream flows and preservation of the natural environment." 117 Though the court acknowledged the vagueness of the statutory language, it nevertheless upheld the delegation of authority to an administrative agency,
reasoning that the delegated duties involved factual determinations that were within the specific expertise of the agency. 118 Any
other conclusion would, in the court's view, impose an "impossible
task" on the legislature. 119
Recognition and acquisition of instream water rights is especially
significant in prior appropriation jurisdictions. As the Colorado decision demonstrates, such recognition generally means that a court
will accept the legitimacy of the instream right. Though statutory
recognition of instream water rights clearly does not prevent challenges by private rights holders upset by the change in law, such
113
See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation
Bd., 594 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1979); Idaho Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 96
Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974).
114
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 594
P.2d 570 (Colo. 1979).
110
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 37-92-102(3), 37-92-103(4) (1973 & Supp. 1989).
116
Colorado River Water, o94 P.2d at 574.
111
/d. at 577. The Board had assumed that maintenance of adequate wildlife through
minimum flows would promote environmental preservation. /d.
m Id. at 57 5-76.
m /d. at 576.
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recognition does facilitate the judiciary's task of resolving the challenges. In addition, once the instream right is acquired, the holder
gains priority over subsequent rights. Indeed, even when the instream right is junior to other water rights, the holder of the instream right retains the power to stop certain changes in stream
conditions that would damage that right. 120

2.

The Public Interest Standard

Legislatures in both riparian and appropriation jurisdictions
have modified their common law water allocation systems to include a public interest component. In some jurisdictions that component is incorporated directly into the water allocation process,
while in others it appears in key definitional provisions. For the
most part, prior appropriation jurisdictions seem to have been
more aggressive in using the public interest legislation to protect
instream use.
Although the extent of the legislative changes in riparian jurisdictions varies significantly from state to state, many of the statutes enable administrative agencies to consider the public interest
in regulating water users.I 21 Florida, for example, has enacted comprehensive water reforms which require development of a state
water use plan incorporating economic and environmental considerations.122 Virginia, although not adopting comprehensive reforms, has also enacted statutory provisions recognizing the legitimacy of environmental values. One 1989 enactment of particular
"" See A. Tarlock, supra note 1, §§ 5.08[1], 5.17[3][a]; Ausness, supra note 3, at 429-30. A
junior appropriator generally "has the right to the continuation of stream conditions as they
existed" at the time of his appropriation and can object to "all changes in the point of
diversion or place of use." A. Tarlock, supra note 1, § 5.17[3][a], at 5-71.
'"' For a discussion of water reforms in eastern states, see Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Program for Reform, 24 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 547 (1983). Many of these
reforms appear to be based on the Model Water Code, which sets forth a comprehensive
permit system for allocating water rights. Among other provisions, the Model Water Code
declares ecological, recreational, and scenic values to be " in the public interest." A Model
Water Code § 1.02(3) (F. Maloney, R. Ausness & J. Morris 1972) [hereinafter cited as Model
Water Code]. Public interest criteria, in turn, are relevant to the permit issuance process.
Id. § 2.02(1). Although the Model Water Code also provides for the establishment of minimum flow levels, see id. § 1.07(4)-(5), some riparian jurisdictions appear to have ignored this
provision in modifying their water allocation systems. Until recently, Virginia was one of
those jurisdictions. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. See generally Hayes &
Watson, Stream Flow Maintenance in Virginia, 18 U. Rich. L. Rev. 485 (1984) (discussing
instream protection under Virginia law).
ua See Fla. Stat. § 373.036 (1987); see also id. ch. 373 (1987 & Supp. 1989) (setting forth
comprehensive reforms for water resources).
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significance refocuses the riparian doctrine's reasonable use requirement by defining "beneficial use" to include "both instream
and offstream uses," with instream uses entailing "the protection
of fish and wildlife habitat, maintenance of waste assimilation, recreation, navigation, and cultural and aesthetic values." 123 The enactment also recognizes the importance of protecting beneficial instream uses. 124
Many prior appropriation states also have modified their common law systems to allow consideration of the public interest in
the water allocation process. The public interest provisions typically are found in comprehensive statutory permit schemes and are
but one of several factors affecting water allocation decisions! 215 Although these states have not traditionally defined the public interest to include environmental values, the states are beginning to expand the concept to include such values. 126 In some jurisdictions
this expansion is occurring through the legislative process. Utah,
for instance, has a statutory provision that authorizes the state engineer to reject an appropriation request if it would "unreasonably
affect public recreation or the natural stream environment" or the
public welfare. 127 In other jurisdictions the expansion is . being
achieved through broad judicial interpretation of general public interest legislation. In the 1985 decision Shokal v. Dunn, for example, the Idaho Supreme Court interpreted the statutory duty to
protect the public interest as including consideration of stream environment, wildlife, recreation, aesthetics, and other related values.128 The court justified its broad interpretation by pointing to a
related statutory provision generally declaring environmental values to be in the public interest. 129
In applying the public interest standard, states either adopt a
rebuttable presumption about the minimum flow needed to preserve instream values or take a case-by-case approach. Under the
rebuttable presumption approach, the appropriate administrative
Act of Mar. 20, 1989, ch. 410, 1989 Va. Acts 584, 584 (codified at Va. Code Ann. § 62.110(b) (Supp. 1989)).
124
/d., 1989 Va. Acts 584, 585 (codified at Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-ll(F) (Supp. 1989)).
120
See generally A. Tarlock, supra note 1, §§ 5.12-.13 (discussing the western permit
systems and the public interest limitation).
••• See id. § 5.13[1].
127
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8(1) (1989); see also Cal. Water Code §§ 1253, 1255-1257.5
(West 1971 & Supp. 1990) (providing for consideration of beneficial use, including instream
use, and for rejection of applications not in the public interest).
••• 109 Idaho 330, 707 P.2d 441 (1985).
129
/d. at 337-38, 707 P.2d at 448-49.
123
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agency determines in advance the minimum flow needed to protect
instream values in a particular stream or river. Permit applicants
seeking a reduction in that flow then must establish that the reduction would be in the public interest. The case-by-case approach, in contrast, requires the appropriate agency to determine
instream flow needs for each water rights application. 130
Both approaches have their strengths and weaknesses. The rebuttable presumption approach, for example, tends to cause significant controversy while the minimum flow level is being set. After
that decision is made, however, the approach helps to facilitate the
permit process for most projects and thus to reduce the strain on
administrative resources.lSl The case-by-case approach, on the
other hand, diffuses controversy surrounding the setting of minimum flows. State agencies following that approach, however, tend
to face a prolonged permitting process, for they generally have to
consider the mm1mum flow issue for each water rights
application. 132
B. Minimum Flow Statutes
A growing number of states have enacted legislation protecting
minimum flows. This legislation comes in a variety of forms, including withdrawal programs, reservation provisions, and minimum or preservation flow programs.
1.

Withdrawal and Reservation Programs

Some types of withdrawal legislation expressly authorize the
withdrawal of water from further appropriation. 133 Other types
provide for the suspension of proposed appropriations pending a
determination of their impact on existing rights and on the public
good. 134 All versions result in affirmative protection of instream
uses.
Virtually identical in effect to withdrawal provisions, reservation
programs set up a process for reserving water for a variety of purposes, including instream purposes. Montana law, for instance, au130
Lamb, Predicting the Results of Instream Flow Policies, in Water for the 21st Century: Will It be There? 840, 842 (M. Collins ed. 1984).
131
See id.
132
See id. at 842-43.
139
See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 536.410, 538.110-.300 (1989).
184
See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. §§ 85-2-601 to 85-2-608 (1989); Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-6-1
to 73-6-2 (1989).
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thorizes reservations by government officials for "existing or future
beneficial uses," including "agricultural, municipal, and minimum
flow purposes for the protection of existing rights and aquatic
life." 136 To obtain a reservation, an applicant has to establish the
purpose and need for the reservation, the quantity of water to be
reserved, and consistency with the public interest. 136 Reservation
programs typically enable a state agency to grant variances and
require periodic review of reserved flows. 137
In practice, instream reservations can have the same. effect as
recognition of instream water rights. Under the prior appropriation
system, the reservations would acquire a priority over subsequently
acquired water rights. Further, in a riparian jurisdiction, the instream reservation would be treated as a preferred riparian use.
The variance and periodic review features of reservation programs,
however, differentiate the programs from the more direct approach
of recognizing instream water rights, making the reservation programs potentially weaker. 138

2.

Minimum or Preservation Flow Programs

Taking a slightly different approach from the withdrawal and
reservation programs, numerous states have enacted specific provisions authorizing the setting of minimum or preservation flow
levels for watercourses. These programs typically provide for the
prohibition or the cessation of uses that interfere with the established flow levels. 139 Several different approaches are used to establish minimum flows. Some jurisdictions follow an ecological approach, defining the minimum flow to be the level required to
sustain fish, vegetation, and other aquatic wildlife. Others take a
broader approach, directing agencies to consider recreational and
aesthetic interests as well. 140
In recent years a few states have enacted more comprehensive
130

Mont. Code Ann. §§ 85-2-316(1), 85-2-605 (1989).
!d. § 85-2-316(4)(a).
137
See Lamb, supra note 130, at 844.
138
See id.
138
See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 26-141b, -141c (West 1975 & Supp. 1989); Fla. Stat.
§§ 373.036(7), .042, .044 (1988); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 51-3-7, 51-3-55 (Supp. 1989). But see
Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 536.235, .310(7), .310(13), .325 (1989) (providing for the establishment of
minimum flows but explicitly preferring human consumption needs).
140
See Ausness, supra note 3, at 432. See generally Lamb, Quantifying lnstream Flows:
Matching Policy and Technology, in Instream Flow Protection in the West 23-39 (L.
MacDonnell, T . Rice & S. Shupe eds. 1989) (discussing instream assessment policy and
technology).
136
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legislation to preserve instream flows. Recent Virginia legislation,
for example, establishes a low flow permitting system. 141 The statute authorizes the State Water Control Board to declare an area to
be a surface water management area when the Board determines
that the area has substantial instream values, that low flow conditions and offstream uses could threaten those values, and that the
public welfare, health, and safety require regulation. 142 After such
a declaration is made, no party in the area may withdraw surface
water, unless otherwise exempted, without a withdrawal permit. 143
During periods of low flow, permittees may become subject to certain permit conditions designed to protect beneficial instream
uses. 144 This type of legislation overcomes some of the weaknesses
of the more specific mandates to establish minimum flows. By establishing a comprehensive and flexible administrative structure
for protecting important instream values during periods of low
flow, the Virginia General Assembly has avoided some of the
problems caused by broad-based statutory exceptions and inflexible legislative determinations of regulatory need. 1411

C. Statutes Indirectly Protecting Instream Values
In addition to direct protection of instream values, legislatures
have also adopted indirect forms of protection. Several states, for
example, have enacted environmental policy acts that have been
interpreted as imposing an affirmative obligation on state agencies
to consider environmental factors. The Louisiana decision discussed earlier demonstrates this point. In that decision, the court
interpreted the state's Environmental Affairs Act as imposing a
duty of environmental protection in conjunction with the constitutional provisions. 148 Many states have also followed the example of
the federal government in enacting legislation to protect wild and
"' Act of Apr. 5, 1989, ch. 721, 1989 Va. Acts 1697 (codified at Va. Code Ann. §§ 62.1-242
to -253 (Supp. 1989)).
142
Va. Code Ann. § 62.1·246 (Supp. 1989).
143
ld. § 62.1-247.
144
ld. § 62.1-248.
,.. Whether these advantages actually result in greater instream protection remains to be
seen. The State Water Control Board currently is in the process of adopting regulations to
implement the low ftow statute. See State Water Control Board, Notice of Intended Regulatory Action, in 6 Va. Register of Regulations, issue 4, at 656 (Nov. 20, 1989).
148
See Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d
1152, 1154-55, 1156-57 (La. 1984). For a discussion of the most significant environmental
policy act, the National Environmental Policy Act, see 1 Law of Environmental Protection
ch. 9 (S. Novick, D. Stever & M. Mellon eds. 1989).
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scenic rivers. Because these statutes restrict access to protected
rivers, they indirectly protect instream values. 147 Finally, some
states protect instream flow through legislation regulating dam
construction and operation. 148
In conclusion, like its judicial counterpart, legislative protection
of instream use also represents an important but limited step in
the evolution of public property rights in environmental resources.
Although the legislative forms of protection tend to be more comprehensive and specific than the judicial techniques, the legislative
devices also suffer from numerous limitations and problems. For
the most part, these weaknesses reflect the need for an overriding
theory or concept of public rights. Part IV explores one such theory: the public property concept.
IV.

ENVIRONMENTAL WATER RIGHTS AND THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC
PROPERTY

The discussion of the protectionist movement for instream uses
clearly demonstrates that the law is gradually recognizing and accommodating the public interest in environmental uses ·of water
resources. Yet to be established, however, is the actual or appropriate direction of this evolutionary process under the law. Of particular concern is the relationship of the newly protected public interest in instream use to private property rights. Because the public
interest being recognized under the protectionist movement exists
in resources that traditionally have been .subject to a private allocation system, the emerging public interest is sure to have an adverse effect on private rights. As the demand for water resources
rises, 149 conflicts between public and private interests will become
increasingly common. Unless the evolutionary process provides a
principled system for resolving those conflicts, they will, over time,
escalate into angry confrontations and protracted legal disputes.
Effective use of such a valuable and scarce resource as water, in
other words, requires a balanced and fair conflict resolution
system.

147

See Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1271-1287 (West 1985 & Supp.
1989); Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 5093.50-.69 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§
146.200-.360 (1987); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 46A-1-15 to 46A-1-16 (1987); Lamb, supra
note 130, at 845.
148
See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 401-407 (Supp. 1989); see also Ausness, supra
note 3, at 433.
.
149
For authorities discussing America's increasing demand for water, see supra note 1.
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Current devices developed to protect public instream uses generally do not provide for such a conflict resolution system. For the
most part, the protective devices serve a limited function: to establish· the basic legitimacy of the public interest in environmental
water uses. Little, if any, guidance is provided on the nature of the
public interest, the level of protection owed to that interest, or the
impact on private rights. 150 Nor do the devices attempt to provide
a unified, consistent, or coherent approach to instream use protection. While some forms of protection focus on navigation-related
uses, others take an ecological perspective. Still others follow a
broad-based approach, protecting recreational, ecological, and aesthetic uses. 161 Similar variety exists in the allocation of decisionmaking responsibility. In some jurisdictions protection of instream
uses arises from judicial declarations, while in others primary
responsibility rests with the legislative and administrative
branches. 1112
'
Judicial devices like the expansive readings of the
navigability
concept and the public trust doctrine demonstrate the limited usefulness of current forms of protection. The recreational use test for
navigability, for example, simply provides a judicial basis for recognizing certain public recreational interests under the navigability
concept. Unless a public purpose is related to recreational use, the
purpose probably will not merit protection under the test. 1113 Additionally, as a judicial interpretation of the navigability concept,
100
Some might argue that sufficient guidance has been provided in prior appropriation
jurisdictions that have statutorily modified their water rights systems to recognize instream
appropriations. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. As part of the prior appropriation system, an instream appropriation would be subject to the same priority rules that
govern traditional water uses. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. But as recent
challenges to those.statutory amendments demonstrate, the incorporation of instream uses
into the prior appropriation system is far from clear. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
101
See, e.g., supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
••• See, e.g., supra notes 44-57, 112, 135-37 and accompanying text.
••• See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Some courts appear to limit public recreational interests to uses involving recreational navigation. See, e.g., Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo.
835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954); Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1969); see also A. Tarlock,
supra note 1, § 8.05[2], at 8-29 to -30 (discussing judicial use of the pleasure boat test). But
cf. Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360, 363, 528 P.2d
1295, 1298 (1974) (recognizing a broad category of recreational uses when a stream is physically navigable by small craft); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 199, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143
(1893) (suggesting a broader approach to recreational use). To the extent that recreational
rights are not limited to n~vigational activities, serious legal problems could arise. Cf. A.
Tarlock, supra note 1, § 8.05[3] (discussing the constitutionality of liberal navigability
tests).
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public recreational rights appear to be limited in scope. Once a
watercourse loses the ability to sustain recreational use under normal conditions, public rights would seem to end. 1114 Furthermore,
as a general matter, courts have tended to protect public recreational rights only in situations involving private action designed
primarily to prevent or interfere with public use. 156 With a few
possible exceptions, the rights do not appear to include the power
to prevent indirect or unintentional interference with public recreational use resulting from the exercise of traditionally recognized
water rights. 156 Though the public trust doctrine clearly has the

••• Cf. Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont.
1984) ("capability of use of the waters for recreational purposes determines whether the
waters can be so used"); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163,
170 (Mont. 1984) (recreational capability is the key); cf. also A. Tarlock, supra note 1, §
8.05[2) (discussing the recreational capacity test).
'"" See, e.g., Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954) (where the court ordered a private waterfront landowner to desist in efforts to block passage down adjoining
stream); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984)
(where the court enjoined a private waterfront landowner from installing a fence to block
public use); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984)
(where the court protected public recreational use against interference and harassment by a
private waterfront landowner); Coleman v. Schaeffer, 163 Ohio St. 202, 126 N.E.2d 444
(1955) (where the court granted an injunction requiring the removal of steel cables and a
wire fence built by waterfront landowners to block other riparians' use of a stream). Quite a
few of the decisions involve trespassing claims by private waterfront landowners or declaratory judgment requests by members of the public. Typically a private landowner has asserted exclusive use rights in water flowing past his land and has denied even the existence
of a right of passage in the public. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Mcilroy, 268 Ark. 227, 595 S.W.2d
659, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980); Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974); State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley
Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945); Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1969); Day v.
Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
106
See supra note 155 and accompanying text. But cf. State ex rel. Brown v. Newport
Concrete Co., 44 Ohio App. 2d 121, 336 N.E.2d 453 (1975) (where the court ordered the
removal of a concrete structure built by a waterfront landowner for a purpose that is not
clearly a traditional water right-the creation of a crossing for the landowner's trucks).
The courts are somewhat inconsistent, though, i~ describing the nature of public recreational rights. Some Montana courts, for example, have suggested that private water rights
sometimes are superior to public recreational rights. See Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1094 (Mont. 1984) (appearing to accommodate the
wharf rights of private waterfront landowners by recognizing a very limited public right to
portage around barriers); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d
163, 170, 172 (Mont. 1984) (apparently making a similar accommodation, as well as recognizing the private landowner's superior right to appropriate for irrigation purposes). But
then, in recognizing the existence of public recreational rights, the courts sometimes broadly
state that private parties cannot interfere with the public rights. See, e.g., id. at 170. The
inconsistency may be due, in part, to the overlapping origins.of public recreational rights. In
Montana, for example, the navigability concept, public trust doctrine, and state Constitution all appear to play a role. See id. at 169-71.
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capability of providing more meaningful protection, 1117 judicial use
of the doctrine to protect instream use raises many unanswered
questions. As noted earlier, those questions include the criteria to
be used in defining the scope of the public trust interest in instream use, as well as the relationship of that interest to the private water rights system. 1118
Legislative forms of protection suffer from similar limitations.
Some statutory devices, for example, are nothing more than vague
policy statements, committing to instream use protection in general terms only. 159 These devices often recognize the importance of
instream use protection, but then fail to provide for implementation of a specific instream use program. 160 Other legislative provisions represent a clear commitment to environmental water uses,
typically authorizing a particular state agency or official to promote instream values. 161 With some exceptions, though, these provisions tend to be narrow or restrained in scope. They, for example, may limit instream appropriations to particular waters 162 or
provide for a case-by-case determination of instream flow needs. 163
Furthermore, even when a relatively strong legislative commitment
exists, it often is weakened by statutory exceptions 16" or by provisions permitting variances. 1M Few, if any, of the legislative devices
provide sufficient guidance on the nature and scope of public environmental water rights and on their relationship with private
rights. 166

See supra notes 84·90 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the implications of the public trust doctrine for environmental regulation, see Butler, supra note 101,
part liLA.
168
See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
,.. See, e.g., supra notes 123-29, 133-34 and accompanying text.
160
See generally supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (discussing the public interest legislation in prior appropriation states).
161
See, e.g., supra notes 112, 135-37, 141-45 and accompanying text.
160
See, e.g., supra note 112 and accompanying text (Idaho legislation).
168
See, e.g., supra note 112 and accompanying text (Colorado ·legislation).
16
' See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-243 (1989).
166
See, e.g., supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
188
Although legislation does not have to-and arguably should not-provide detailed
guidance to regulators, legislation still must define basic policies and standards in order for
implementation to be responsive and effective. Statutory forms of instream protection vary
in their effectiveness in providing guidance. Legislation protecting instream values in designated waters probably is as specific as any instream legislation. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Res.
Code §§ 5093.50-.69 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 146.200-.360 (1987). But
even that legislation does not always provide specific guidance on the relationship of instream uses to private land uses. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 5093.546, .58 (West 1984 &
Supp. 1990). But see Ky. Rev. Stat. § 146.290 (1987) (defining land uses permitted in in167
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For the evolutionary process to be complete, lawmakers must
move beyond the legitimation stage and provide some content to
the public interest in instream use. Current protective devices represent an important first step in the evolution of public environmental water rights: they reflect growing acceptance of instream
values in a wide array of legal arenas and thus make significant
strides in establishing the legitimacy of the public interest in instream use. But while current devices have opened the door for
public instream uses, they have not provided a principled or coherent body of law to govern the emerging public interest, especially
its relationship with other interests. In addition to legitimation,
the evolutionary process must find an effective way to integrate the
new concept of public environmental water rights into the established legal system. Among other topics, this integration process
must address the issue of conflict resolution, for standards and policies definitely will be needed to guide public and private parties in
the exercise of their rights and courts and regulators in the administration of the water rights system.
Application of the public property concept to environmental
water uses would move the evolutionary process from the legitimation to the integration stage. As the following discussion will explain, the public property concept is a natural and necessary complement to the private rights system. Though use of the public
property concept runs contrary to the normal preference for private property rights, the utilitarian and nonutilitarian justifications supporting the private rights system sometimes require public rights instead. By identifying when these justifications support
public, as opposed to private, rights, lawmakers can provide a basis
for defining the nature and extent of public instream uses and for
resolving conflicts between public and private interests. Many instream uses, with their site-specific nature, their positive societal

stream area). On the surface at least, prior appropriation legislation recognizing instream
water rights also would appear to be effective in providing guidance. By extending the appropriation doctrine to include instream values, this form of legislation has incorporated
instream use into the traditional priority system governing water appropriations. But as
recent challenges to the instream water rights legislation suggest, the implications of the
extension are not clear nor well-accepted. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
One step in the right direction is the recently enacted Virginia low flow statute. That
legislation overlays instream use protection on the private water rights system, making instream protection an obligation of nonexempt parties holding withdrawal permits. The effectiveness of the statute is not yet clear, though, for the state agency charged with responsibility under the statute is currently developing regulations to implement the statute. See
supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
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effects, and their value-generating tendencies, seem especially
suited to the public property concept. Recognizing appropriate instream uses as public property thus will serve the valuable function of integrating emerging public interests into more traditional
law.
Public Property as a Necessary Complement to Private
Property
A.

Virtually since the time of the first English settlement, America
has relied on a private property system to allocate rights and interests in most of its natural resources. 167 By now, the economic arguments for a private property system are both well-known and wellaccepted. Valuable resources must be privately owned to encourage
parties to engage in productive activities. Without private ownership rights, a user would have no incentive to invest in the longterm use of resources, not even if it was more efficient than shortterm use. Absent a private ownership interest, the user would not
be guaranteed a return on her investment. Third parties who did
not contribute to the resource's development would be able to capture the profit from that development without fear of reprisal
through the property system. Because the user would not be able
to seek judicial protection of her expectancy, she eventually would
pursue other uses requiring less investment and providing a
quicker, but lower, return. 168
Noneconomic justifications for private property rights also are
well-known, though perhaps not as well-accepted. According to one
commentator's view, our private property system is the product of
167

A private rights system appeared as early as 1616 in Virginia. Although King James I
had authorized private land distribution when he issued the first two charters for the colonization of Virginia, the patentees initially preferred to hold land in a communal-type arrangement for the general benefit of the colonists. Eventually the patentees realized that
this arrangement was stymieing growth, and they then authorized private land distribution.
L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, § 8.1, at 245.
••• See R. Posner, supra note 65, § 3.1; see also Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711, 711-12 (1986).
Posner's well-known example of a farmer planting corn demonstrates the arguments for private property. He writes:
Imagine a society in which all property rights have been abolished. A farmer plants
corn, fertilizes it, and erects scarecrows, but when the corn is ripe his neighbor reaps
and sells it. The farmer has no legal remedy against his neighbor's conduct since he
owns neither the land that he sowed nor the crop. After a few such incidents the
cultivation of land will be abandoned and the society will shift to methods of subsistence (such as hunting) that involve less preparatory investment.
R. Posner, supra note 65, § 3.1, at 27 (footnotes omitted).
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the Lockean theory of government adopted by the framers of the
Constitution.169 Under a Lockean political structure, individuals
give up their right to use force in exchange for the right to keep
the surplus gains resulting from the formation of the government.170 Private parties generally are allowed to keep the fruits of
their labor-that is, their expectation of gain from the use of property-as long as the profits are not obtained by force or to the total
exclusion of others. 171 According to another commentator, private
property provides a necessary basis for civil liberties. 172 Without
private property, an individual would not be adequately protected
from government exploitation and aggression. Because such an individual would be dependent on government for all necessities, he
would be an easy target for majoritarian exploitation. Private
property thus provides the individual with a "zone of privacy," enabling him to move freely and without fear of government
reprisal. 173
Despite the economic and political arguments for private property rights, some public property rights do indeed exist. The concept of public property, very generally speaking, involves resources
not held exclusively by private parties, but rather open to the public. To the extent, then, that public property rights exist in a resource, private entitlements in that resource are necessarily limited. At the very least, private parties lose the right of exclusivity,
and if the public right is strong enough, private parties may even
find they lack an ownership interest. 174
169

See R. Epstein, supra note 67, at 13-16.
See id. at 9-10, 12-15. See generally J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government
(1976) (discussing, among other topics, the state of nature, property, and political or civil
society).
171
See R. Epstein, supra note 67, at 10-11.
172
Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 771-72 (1964).
173
Id. at 771, 778. For more of Reich's views on the relationship between property, civil
liberties, and the modern welfare state, see id. at 771-77.
m Examples of traditionally recognized public property concepts include the public trust
doctrine and the commons concept. As explained earlier, under the public trust doctrine,
government holds certain resources, principally navigable waters and their beds, in trust for
the benefit of the public. Although the nature of the public's trust interest varies according
to the jurisdiction, it typically includes a use right in trust resources. See supra notes 35-43
and accompanying text. In some jurisdictions, those resources may even be privately owned.
See generally L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, ch. 5 (discussing the public trust
doctrine).
Though similar in scope, the commons concept does not impose any trust responsibilities"
on government, but rather recognizes interests in the public at large. During the early development of the concept in England, common rights generally existed in arable lands and
entitled the rightholders, or the commoners, to make certain defined uses like pasturage and
170
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Traditionally lawmakers and commentators have recognized
public property rights in one of two situations. The first situation,
sometimes called the plenteous goods exception, involves resources
that are so abundant or unbounded it is not worthwhile to create a
private allocation system. The costs of such an effort would outweigh any benefits derived from privatization. 176 Resources typically included in this category are the oceans and air. 176
The second situation, sometimes referred to as the public goods
exception, involves resources for which the private market system
predictably fails to produce socially optimal uses. 177 Although private agreements among resource owners could cure some of these
market failures, the costs of private negotiation are high. Further,
where a large number of resource owners are involved, collective
agreements may be impossible. Government ownership and control
thus are needed in the public goods situation to correct the market's inefficiencies and achieve an optimal allocation of
resources. 178
Such a situation would exist, for example, when many people
want to use a resource, like the national forests, but their numbers

timber-cutting. Although a common right of fishing also existed, the main function of the
English commons concept was to promote agricultural uses. The American version, in contrast, focuses primarily on coastal waters and lands. In addition to the common uses of
fishing, fowling, and hunting, the American version also can involve an ownership interest.
See generally id. ch. 6 (discussing the development of the commons concept).
For further examples of traditional public property theories, see Rose, supra note 168, at
713-14, 723-49.
,.. Rose, supra note 168, at 717.
178
/d. at 717-18.
117
Scholars have defined the phrase "public goods" in a variety of ways. Some, for example, focus generally on the existence of free riders. See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 65, § 16.4,
at 351 & n.4 ("A public good is simply a good the provision of which involves free-rider
problems."). Others tie the definition of "public goods" more specifically to the existence of
free riders who can benefit at no additional cost to anyone else. See, e.g., H. Manne, The
Ecpnomics of Legal Relationships 353 (1975) ("The public goods problem arises because
certain kinds of economic goods, once produced, can be enjoyed by individuals for whom
they have positive value at zero marginal cost."), Still others use the phrase "public goods"
to refer to any resource that should not, under economic theory, be privately owned. SeeR.
Cooter & T. Ulen, Law and Economics 112 (1988). In contrast to the textual approach, some
of these other definitions would include plenteous goods. See id.; cf. Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & Econ. 11, 19-20 (1964) (recognizing
the plenteous goods situation as a public goods problem).
"" Rose, supra note 168, at 718-19; see also id. at 719-20 (discussing four caveats that
apply to this conclusion). See generally H. Manne, supra note 177, at 351-480 (setting forth
readings on public goods, collective goods, and externalities). But cf. Demsetz, supra note
177, at 19-20 (arguing that efficiency concerns justify excluding free riders even in most
public goods situations).
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are too high and their individual interests are too diffused and
small for their needs to be met by marketplace transactions. 179 Or
a public goods situation would arise when use of a resource, }ike
railroads or bridges, involves economies of scale. 180 When such a
production condition exists, the average cost of production decreases as the level of output increases, making it advantageous to
have only one firm producing the good. To ensure the realization of
these advantages, government needs to become the manager of the
resource. 181
Some scholars would further limit the definition of public goods
to resources having two related characteris,tics. First, the resource
would have to involve "non-rivalrous consumption"-that is,
resource consumption by one person would not reduce the amount
available to other persons. 182 Second, the costs of excluding
nonpaying consumers of the resource would need to be too high for
any party seeking profit-maximization to pursue production of the
resource. 183 This definition excludes some situations meeting the
more general definition. Some resources involving economies of
scale, for example, would not qualify as public goods. Although
government management still might be needed to correct the market failure surrounding these resources, the non-rivalrous consumption characteristic would not necessarily exist. At some point,
in~reased consumption would reduce the amount available to
others; high demand for a bridge during rush hour, for instance,
would preclude some from using the bridge.
The plenteous resources and public goods situations represent
exceptions to the private property regime. In both instances, rights
of ownership or control are awarded to the government, or the organized state, as the representative of the public interest in the
170
See Rose, supra note 168, at 719; cf. Stroup & Baden, Externality, Property Rights,
and the Management of Our National Forests, 16 J.L. & Econ. 303, 306-09 (1973) (presenting the arguments against market management of our national forests).
180
Rose, supra note 168, at 719.
181
R. Cooter & T. Ulen, supra note 177, at 38-39; Rose, supra note 168, at 766-67.
182
R. Cooter & T. Ulen, supra note 177, at 46.
,.. /d. Cooter and Ulen identify the national defense as an example of a good meeting
their two-part test. They explain:
Consider the conventional example of a public good: national defense. The fact that
one citizen is secure from the threat of invasion by a foreign army does not leave any
less security for other citizens. Furthermore, it is difficult to exclude any citizen from
enjoying the security provided to others. Because of these two characteristics, public
goods are not likely to be provided at all by the market, or if they are privately provided, provided in less than socially optimal amounts.
!d.
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regulated resource. To these two exceptions, Professor Carol Rose
would add a third that recognizes property rights in the unorganized public. Calling this exception the "inherently public property"
situation, Professor Rose explains that the two traditional categories "do not logically exhaust all the possible solutions" to the market failure problem; nor do they adequately explain all of the public rights theories that have developed under the common law. 184
In addition to the legal developments that have recognized property rights in the organized public, there also are doctrines that
seem to place property interests in the public at large-interests
that are collectively shared by society and thus independent of any
interest existing in a government manager. 186 Justification for this
last category of public property is derived from the realization that
government management, like private management, can pose "difficult problems," including high management costs and ill-advised,
politically motivated redistributions. 186 Recognizing property rights
in the unorganized public can, in appropriate situations, result in
what Professor Rose labels the "comedy of the commons"-that is,
in a comedic or happy result producing infinitely expanding wealth
and positive socialization effects. 187
Under this theory, two key criteria serve as the basis for identifying inherently public property. One criterion, the holdout factor,
concerns a resource's potential for private economic exploitation of
the public interest. Because of the inherent nature of certain resources, the public sometimes develops a particularly strong demand or need for a resource and may even begin to express its
interest informally through a pattern of use. 188 In the absence of
public property rights, such a resource could become subject to the
private holdout power. That is, if market transactions were allowed
to occur, the private resource owner could "hold out" for an exorbitantly high price, demanding "rent" from the public far in excess
of fair market value. Too high a price, in turn, may block fulfillment of important public projects or needs. 189 The public's clear
demand for a resource thus creates the opportunity for private
rent-seeking behavior. Avoiding this behavior requires recognition
of public rights in the resource.
184

•u
18a

187
188
189

Rose, supra note 168, at 720.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 723.
See id. at 760-61.
Id. at 749-50. The holdout problem is the rationale for the eminent domain power. ld.
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The second criterion, described alternately as the publicness or
relative value test, concerns the public's contribution to the value
of a resource. When inherently public property is involved, increas·
ing public use of a resource enhances, rather than diminishes, its
value. Due to nonexclusive, open-ended public access to the resource, increasing returns to scale result: the greater the public
participation, the larger the rate of return. The public, in other
words, deserves a property right in the resource because public·
ness-or nonexclusive, open-ended public use-has created the
property's highest value. 190
Rose offers several examples of resources meeting the two criteria for inherently public property. One of the examples concerns
navigable waterways. 191 She justifies traditional caselaw· recognizing the public's superior right of navigation 192 by explaining that
navigable watercourses involve both the holdout problem and the
publicness factor. Absent recognition of a public right of navigation, private waterfront landowners could demand prohibitively
high prices from the public for the right to pass through their sec·
tion of a watercourse. 193 Though this factor is not sufficient, by it·
self, to justify the existence of public property rights, 194 waterways
also present the classic example of publicness and thus of increasing returns to scale. Nonexclusive, open-ended public navigation of
waterways, in other words, produces the property's highest value:
the more people participating in navigation, the greater the opportunities for commerce and trade and the larger the increase in
wealth and productivity. 19
Expansion of the concept of public property to include interests
in the unorganized public is appealing because of its economic jus·
tifications. The criteria that Rose develops to define inherently
public property continue the economic exploitation theme of the
traditional public property categories. Requiring a holdout situation ensures that the third category-inherently public prop1j

190

ld. at 768-71.
The other examples involve the public interest in roadways and customary claims. See
generally id. at 750-53, 758-61 (discussing the examples).
,.. For her discussion of the traditional caselaw, see id. at 727-30, 735-39.
193
See id. at 753-54; see also id. at 753-58 (discussing the dangers of private monopolization of waterways).
194
See id. at 770-71. The holdout factor is a necessary, but not a sufficient, reason because it does not guarantee that public use will be more valuable than private use. /d. at
761.
••• ld. at 764-66, 769-70.
191
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erty-also focuses on the problem of market failure. Similarly, requiring the publicness of a resource to create its highest value
guarantees that inherently public property promotes socially optimal uses. Under these criteria, then, inherently public property becomes, with the help of modern economic thought, a natural and
logical extension of the traditional public property concept.
Rose's criteria for inherently public property may be too strict,
though. Not all of the justifications that she offers for her criteria
are economic. Yet when she actually defines the criteria, she seems
to retreat unnecessarily to economic principles. Her discussion of
the publicness or relative value test demonstrates this point. In explaining why the public should acquire a property right in resources meeting this criterion, Rose stresses that the public "deserve[s]" the right "because 'publicness,' nonexclusive open access,
create[s] ... [the property's] highest value." 196 The apparent suggestion is that the public would not deserve a right if publicness
did not create the highest value for a resource. Yet doesn't the underlying theory of desert apply regardless of whether public use
results in the highest" valued use? Is a private party entitled to capture publicly created value just because that value is not the highest? If the public does not have a property interest in the value
that it creates, then a private party will be able to exploit the public by capturing that value without giving the public any return on
its investment. Unless a public property interest is recognized, the
private party will not have to buy out the public interest.
Nor does Rose adequately account for situations where the public interest is difficult, if not impossible, to value. Although the
process of valuing environmental assets has progressed significantly/97 accurate valuation of the public interest in natural resources still may not be possible for a variety of reasons. The diffuseness of the public interest in natural resources, the intangible
nature of some public interests, and the absence of an effective
market for measuring public preferences all contribute to the valuation problem. The inability to measure the full value created by
public interest in a resource should not necessarily favor private
rights, at least not when the holders of the private rights would be
196

Id. at 77Q (emphasis in original).
Cf., e.g., Valuing Wildlife: Economic and Social Perspectives (D. Decker & G. Goff eds.
1987) (providing state-of-the-art information on methods of valuing wildlife). But cf. Sagoff,
197

Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1393 (1981) (criticizing reliance on economic theory and market values to justify environmental regulation).
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nonpaying beneficiaries of the publicly created value. Perhaps the
answer is to "fudge" the estimates of the value created by nonexclusive, open-ended public use; the valuator could simply assume
that, because of the sheer numbers, such use must produce the
highest value. In any event, Rose's analysis seems to assume an
ability to value the public interest not necessarily present in the
real world. Eliminating the highest value requirement admittedly
would mean that the public interest, if preferred, would not necessarily promote optimal use. But at least such a step would make
accurate valuations less important and thus would permit recognition of a public property right in less compelling, but nevertheless
important, circumstances.
Noneconomic justifications also are, for the most part, missing
from the Rose theory of inherently public property. 198 To the extent that private property rights fit into our overall theory of government, political ideology and philosophy would appear to offer as
important a basis for public property as economic thinking. If, as
many assert, private property rights are supposed to serve important political and ethical values, then it seems logical to extend the
public property concept to promote those values when the private
system fails to do so. 199 Political exploitation achieved through rna198
As explained above, she hints at a moral foundation to her theory, but fails to incorporate that foundation into her two criteria. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. In
addition, she suggests the possibility of some noneconomic applications of her theory, but
no conclusions are reached. See Rose, supra note 168, at 779-81.
••• For discussions of the political importance of private property rights, see L. Becker,
Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations 75-80 (1977); Liberty, Property, and the Foundations of the American Constitution (E. Paul & H. Dickman eds. 1989); Philbrick, Changing
Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 691 (1938); and Reich, supra note 172, at
771-74. For a discussion of their moral importance, see L. Becker, supra, ~t 81-87. See generally L. Becker, supra (exploring the different philosophic foundations of property);
Michelman, supra note 68, at 1202-13 (summarizing different theories of property).
Both public and private property rights appear to be playing a crucial role in the development of a new political structure for Eastern European countries. An English-language draft
of the statement of principles being used in writing the new Czechoslovakian Constitution,
for example, devotes an entire article to the concept of property. Among other principles,
the article declares that "[o]wnership is inviolable," that "(a]ll forms of ownership are equal
and enjoy equal protection," and that "(e]xpropriation is possible only with compensation."
Civic Forum in Bohemia and Moravia, Statement of Principles for First Draft of the New
Czechoslovak Constitution art. VII (English-language draft) [hereinafter cited as Czech.
Statement of Principles] (copy on file with author). In addition, the statement recognizes
"all forms of ownership which serve the general benefit and welfare of the country and
advance enterprise and prosperity" and declares the earth's waters, energy resources, and
raw materials to be in the "exclusive ownership of the state." ld. Finally, the statement
allows state "intervention into economic activity ... only in urgent cases, on the basis of
law," to "preserve live [sic] and health," to "preserve and protect a sound natural environ-
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nipulation of private property can be just as devastating as economic exploitation. Thus, for example, public property rights may
deserve recognition when a resource becomes so scarce, valuable,
and vital that recognition is needed to preserve the peace, ensure
fair and equitable results, and maintain democratic values. Alternatively, public property rights may be justifiable when a resource
is closely linked to fundamental political rights, much like navigable waters are linked to the right to travel or the broadcast spectrum is linked to freedom of speech. 200 Recognition of public property rights, in other words, may become necessary when our
private property system no longer allocates interests in resources
consistent with crucial aspects of our political ideology.
Using political theory and democratic values to justify public
property rights would remove some of the tangibleness required by
the Rose analysis. Her explanation of inherently public property
tends to tie the concept to physical resources like roads and waterways and to traditional property rights like ownership and use. 201
Though the public interest in natural resources often will include
traditional property interests in physical resources, it also may involve intangible concerns like environmental preservation and ecological appreciation. Just because the interest is esoteric and intangible, it does not necessarily follow that the public interest is not
legitimate nor valuable. To the contrary, ecological purposes, if effectively pursued, can have significant long~term benefits.202
Recognition of these intangible public interests may require
some broadening of the public property concept to include not

ment," and to ens1,1re the "nourishment" of the population, the "protection of the rights and
freedoms of citizens," and the "interests of the national defense." ld.
200
Although Rose defines navigable waters as inherently public property and the broadcast spectrum as public goods, she appears to rely solely on economic justifications. See
Rose, supra note 168, at 718-19, 753-58, 764-66, 769-70.
201
See Rose, supra note 168. At the end of her article, however, she explores, on a preliminary basis only, some more abstract applications of her theory. See id. at 777-81.
02
'
See, e.g., 1980 Council on Environmental Quality Ann. Rep. 31-40 (discussing, among
other topics, the utilitarian justifications for preserving endangered species); U.S. Office of
Technology Assessment, Wetlands: Their Use and Regulation 37-65 (OTA-0-206 Mar. 1984)
(discussing the importance and value of wetlands); cf. also Stewart, Economics, Enuiron·
ment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (1984) (arguing that the
conflict between environmental quality and economic development is a false one). For examples of the economic benefits to be derived from natural resources, see L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, at 74-84, 100-01 (describing commercial and noncommercial uses of
Virginia's coastal resources). Even weak environmental programs can produce surprising results. See generally Butler, supra note 101 (discussing the effectiveness of state environmental programs).
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only a right in the unorganized public that can be asserted against
the government, but also the power to achieve a reallocation of resources through proper government channels and in appropriate
circumstances. That is, while recognition of a public property right
may not always enable the public to take action against its government, recognition may empower the public to pursue majoritarian
measures perhaps even without having to account to private property owners adversely affected by the measures. 203 Such a property
right thus would serve a legitimating function-legitimating future
government action instigated by members of the unorganized public pursuant to their property interest. 204 By expanding public
property to include intangible, nontraditional property interests
like this legitimating interest, the law would be better able to deal
with all economic and political failures of the private property
system.
B.

Instream Water Use as Public Property

Instream water uses provide an excellent example of how the
concept of public property is needed to complement private property rights. As explained earlier, America's water allocation systems have tended to serve narrow categories of private interests
having a clear consumptive-use orientation. For the most part,
those systems have not accommodated the public interest in water
resources, especially its interest in nonconsumptive or noncommercial uses like environmental preservation, ecological appreciation,
and recreational pursuits. With the riparian doctrine's focus on
privately owned waterfront land and its preference for reasonable
domestic uses, the doctrine would seem, as a practical matter, to
provide little protection for instream water use. 2011 Nor does the
prior appropriation doctrine offer much hope for the public interest in instream use. Due to the doctrine's actual diversion and beneficial use requirements, consumptive uses clearly are favored over

203
Under the federal Constitution, government may not take private property for public
use without payment of just compensation. U.S. Const. amend V. Whether this constitutional guarantee would be violated by majoritarian measures adopted pursuant to the suggested type of public interest is a question beyond the scope of the present article. For
further discussion of the relationship between environmental regulation and the takings
principle, see Butler, supra note 101, part I.A.
204
For further discussion of this legitimating function, see. Butler, supra note 101, part

I.B.2.
205

See supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
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nonconsumptive interests. 206 Recognition of public property rights
in environmental water uses thus appears to be the only effective
way to correct the deficiencies of the private water rights systems.
Such recognition has already begun to occur in a growing number of jurisdictions. As explained earlier, changes to statutory and
common law are forcing consideration of the public interest in the
water allocation process. Although these changes are rarely, if ever,
couched in terms of public property, they do involve many of the
characteristics of property. The changes, for example, typically
give a use right either to the unorganized public or to its representative, the government. 207 Additionally, the public interest being
recognized often limits private rights in the same resource and generally can be protected in court. 208 Finally, at least some {;hanges
require the public interest in instream uses to be defined in the
same terms as private rights. Under these laws, for example, public
rights must have quantitative limits and acquire a priority status
similar to private rights. 209
In addition to having many of the characteristics of property,
instream water rights also reflect economic and political values underlying the concept of public property. As will be explained momentarily, utilitarian and nonutilitarian justifications work well in
the instream use context. The development of public property
rights in environmental water uses, in other words, is precisely the
type of action the law should be taking to correct the economic and
political failures of the private water rights systems. Jurisdictions
thus need to recognize the importance of the public property concept in the instream use context. Some of the economic, political,
and ethical justifications supporting such recognition are examined
below.

206

See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (discussing one court's expansion
of the public trust doctrine to include environmental uses in the unorganized public); supra
note 135 and accompanying text (discussing a Montana law that provides for instream use
rights in the government).
208
See, e.g., supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (discussing how the public trust
interest in instream uses could result in the modification of water allocation decisions and
how the public trust interest might limit private rights); supra note 139 (citing statutory
provisions that provide for judicial protection of minimum flow levels).
209
See, e.g., supra note 120 and accompanying text (describing the priority status granted
holders of instream water rights); supra note 136 and accompanying text (describing a reservation program providing for quantitative limits).
207
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1. Utilitarian Justifications
Absent recognition of public environmental water rights, private
parties have no incentive to consider the public interest in nonconsumptive use of water resources. Despite calls for the establishment of a comprehensive water rights market, such a structure has
not, to date, been developed. 210 Among other problems, the current
market structure often imposes artificial restrictions on alienation
of water rights211 and generally only focuses on traditional consumptive uses. It fails, for example, to give adequate consideration
to the value of the return flow generated by water uses. 212 Since
the current water market does not even adequately account for private interests, its failure to accommodate the more diffused interests of the public in nonconsumptive uses should not be surprising.
The absence of a comprehensive market suggests the possibility
of a market failure. Because transferability is limited under the
current water rights systems, it is easy to imagine a situation where
the market does not promote socially optimal uses. The public interest in ecological or recreational water use is not directly recognized by traditional water allocation principles or by many statutory modifications of those principles. 213 Thus, holders of private
° For arguments for a market approach to water rights, see C. Meyers & R. Posner,
Market Transfers of Water Rights: Toward an Improved Market in Water Resources (National Water Comm'n 1971). See generally 1 Waters and Water Rights §§ 60-64 (R. Clark
ed. 1967 & Supp. 1978) (discussing economics and its relation to water law).
211
The traditional riparian doctrine, for example, prohibits the interbasin transfer of
water, or the diversion of water from a watercourse to areas located outside of the watershed
or basin of the watercourse. Though their rationale for the prohibition is not always clear,
courts apparently reason that such a transfer would violate the requirement that water must
be used for the benefit of riparian land. See Butler, supra note 1, at 108-25, 154-56. The
riparian doctrine, however, does allow severability of riparian rights. That is, in the majority
of riparian jurisdictions, the owner of riparian land can sever the water rights that attach to
that land and transfer the rights without conveying the land. See id. at 137-43. For further
analysis of the severability and transferability of riparian rights, see id. at 137-56.
Most modern permit systems also do not allow free transferability. See Butler, Defining a
Water Ethic Through Comprehensive Reform: A Suggested Framework for Analysis, 1986
U. Ill. L. Rev. 439, 456-57 .
... See R. Posner, supra note 65, § 3.11, at 56-57; Butler, supra note 1, at 150-51. See
generally Butler, supra note 211, at 454-58 (discussing the nature of the water market).
According to one prominent water law scholar, the water market "cannot be relied upon to
always produce optimum results" in part because of "the physical properties of water, its
transient nature, and the interdependence of its use in common by a number of users" and
because of "acknowledged imperfections in the market for water and water rights."
Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic · Forces, and .Public Regula·
tion, 5 Nat. Resources J. 1, 39 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
213
As explained earlier, some modern permit systems have corrected this oversight. See
supra Part III.
21
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water rights generally do not need to consider that interest in making water use decisions. Although the organized public admittedly
could force consideration of the public interest through the exercise of the government's eminent domain power, that type of
government action typically is reserved for public consumptive
needs. 214 The interest of the unorganized public in nonconsumptive
uses thus would, in all likelihood, fall through the cracks of the
current market structure, absent affirmative judicial or legislative
recognition of the interest.
Applying the Rose criteria for inherently public property suggests that such recognition is warranted under the public property
concept. Watercourses easily qualify as the type of resource subject
to the holdout problem. Because of the confined location of waterways, a person owning land along a river or stream could easily
control the flow of the watercourse. 2111 Whether such control necessarily means that the public interest in nonconsumptive uses is
susceptible to private economic exploitation is. not as clear.
To an extent, the answer will depend on the nature of the specific use being promoted and on the strength of the public interest
in that use. Instream uses like navigation present compelling examples of public interests subject to the private holdout power: because of the economic benefits derived from traveling navigable
waters, a private party in a strategic geographic position could easily exploit public demand for navigation. 216 Other instream uses
like recreational activities and ecological preservation are not as
clear-cut. If the public interest in such a use already has been expressed informally over time through habit or custom, then the
public interest could, if intense enough, represent a value or investment that is capable of private exploitation. 217 The public's investment in a resource need not be measurable in precise monetary

Indeed, under a restrictive interpretation of the public use requirement, such a result
may be mandated. The just compensation clause of the federal and state constitutions empowers government to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. V; Cal. Const. art. I, § 19; Va. Const. art. I, § 11. To the
extent that this requirement is interpreted literally to mean actual public use, nonconsumptive public interests would not provide a basis for the exercise of the eminent domain power.
See generally Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 Or. L. Rev. 203,
204-25 (1978) (discussing and analyzing broad and narrow approaches to the public use requirement). For a criticism of the expansive reading given the public use requirement by the
United States Supreme Court, see R. Epstein, supra note 67, at 161-81.
210
Rose, supra note 168, at 753-54, 757-58.
2 8
'
Accord id. at 735-39, 753-61.
211
Accord id. at 759-60.
214
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terms for value to exist. Emotional investments also create demand
and therefore value 218 and can, in some ways, make a party more
vulnerable to exploitation. To the extent, then, that the public already has developed the habit of using a waterway for birdwatching, hiking, and other ecological pursuits, these habits would appear to be susceptible to private exploitation. 219 But if the public
interest is vague and, as yet, undefined or unestablished, then the
case for a holdout problem is considerably weaker, and any recognition of public property rights for that specific instream use must
rest on other grounds. In any event, because of the overlapping
nature of many instream uses, preservation of waterways for public
navigational purposes will result in the promotion of other instream uses as well. Thus, if one instream use merits attention because of the holdout problem, other instream uses also will benefit.
. A similar type of analysis would apply under Rose's second criterion, the publicness or relative value test. At least when the instream use is navigation, the public interest in the nation's waterways presents an easy case for review. Navigable watercourses are
an important avenue of commerce, and commerce, in turn, is one
of the key socializing activities having increasing returns to scale.
The greater the public participation in commerce, the larger the
productivity and the higher the value created by public use. 220
Open-ended public participation in navigation, in other words, results in increasing rates of return. 221
The public interest in other instream uses is not as easy to evalAccord id. at 759.
The more intangible a use, however, the more one can question whether a private
party really can exploit public value. Cf. id. at 781 {questioning whether private parties can
"siphon off the value of expansive public uses").
no Jd. at 766-71, 775-76.
221
For a discussion of the costs and benefits of navigational use, see 1987-1988 Council on
Environmental Quality Ann. Rep. 107-09. The intent of this analysis is not to suggest that
public navigational use should be unmanaged or that unlimited navigation by individual
members of the public would lead to increasing returns to scale. At some point, if too many
members of the public actually use a river or stream for navigation, the watercourse may
become overcrowded and commerce could be hindered. Other costs of overcrowding also
would result. Ecological habitats, for example, would experience greater disturbance as wa~
tercourses reached and surpassed their optimal carrying capacity. States have recognized
the ecological costs of navigation-related activities in their regulatory programs. See; e.g.,
Va. Marine Resources Comm'n, Subaqueous Guidelines for the Permitting of Activities
Which Encroach in, on or over the Submerged Lands of the Commonwealth of Virginia 8-9
{revised Mar. 1986). Increasing public participation, however, does not necessarily require
actual use by all participants. Public participation, for example, could occur through formation of groups or companies in the business of navigation or through group use of ships or
boats.
218

210
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uate. But, though the argument is more difficult to make, instream
uses like recreational activities and ecological pursuits also seem to
involve significant public value, if not increasing returns to scale.
For example, since recreational activities serve an important social
purpose, 222 greater public participation should enhance the value
of recreational sites. The higher the number of public users interested in a recreational resource, the greater the potential for positive socialization effects and the higher the value of the recreational resource. 223 Ecological uses of waterways similarly involve a
socializing element: one person's goal of improved environmental
quality, for instance, cannot be realized without the help of
others.224 Nonexclusive, open-ended public participation in ecological pursuits helps considerably to promote those pursuits and
therefore is responsible for creating much, if not all, of the value
resulting from ecological water use. The only way to achieve the
ecological and recreational goals of instream use is through collective action, and the greater the public commitment, the larger the
return. The very publicness of instream uses like environmental
preservation and recreational pursuits thus produces the value of
the uses, which, in turn, can be exploited by private parties. ~
22

222

See Rose, supra note 168, at 779-81.
Once again, this analysis is not suggesting that open-ended public use necessarily involves unrestricted or unmanaged public use. See supra note 221. For increasing value to
result, public recreational use must be managed either informally by the unorganized public
through doctrines like customary or common rights or by the organized public. Cf. Rose,
supra note 168, at 739-49 (discussing custom and the concept of a managed commons).
Without appropriate management, the benefits of sociability could decrease as the number
of users at any given place and point in time increase. Overcrowding at popular national
parks, in other words, diminishes the immediate enjoyment of the users, though high public
demand for a resource solidifies its position as a public resource. Furthermore, even with
management, increasing public use can result in rising costs and therefore in a decreased
return. For an example of a management plan designed to promote both the goals of environmental preservation and public use, see Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Dep't of the
Interior, Final Environmental Impact Statement: Proposed State-Federal Land Exchange
Involving Portions of False Cape State Park and Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge (1983).
See also L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, § 4.4, at 86-89 (discussing the government's response to problems caused by increasing public use of Back Bay and False Cape) .
••• Others have expressed the societal value of environmental preservation in slightly different terms, focusing on the contemplative and civilizing effects of wilderness areas. See,
e.g., R. Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (3d ed. 1982).
"" The publicness of a use does not necessarily mean that a property right should be
placed in the unorganized, as opposed to the organized, public. As explained earlier, ecological and recreational public use may require management to ensure optimal social value. See
supra notes 221, 223. Management could occur through common law doctrine recognizing
the accountability of users to the public or through statutory law placing control in the
government.
223
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Whether the value created by public instream use is the highest
value is not clear, however, due in large part to the difficulty of
measuring ecological and recreational benefits. What is clear is
that as more members of the public become committed to environmental water use, the payoff resulting from their efforts increases.
One person's participation in ecological and recreational instream
uses becomes, in a sense, more valuable when reciprocated by
others; wider-based use has a greater chance of becoming an established practice. At the very least, then, greater public partic'ipation
in instream uses will enhance the value of the affected water resource both from an environmental and an economic perspective-though for many instream uses, value comparisons with private uses will be difficult to make.
But even if the public value attached to instream uses is not the
highest, the potential for private exploitation nevertheless exists.
Because collective action is required for effective promotion of ecological uses, the very enormity of such collective action suggests
that any value generated by open-ended public involvement will be
large and therefore tempting to private parties. Cleaner, healthier
waters will result in more abundant aquatic resources and thus in
more opportunities and incentives for exploitation. Further, to the
extent that recreational uses have become established patterns of
use, the emotional investment of the public will be high and therefore susceptible to exploitation. Because ecological and recreational
pursuits are very useful to society, both in a socializing and an economic sense, private users should not be allowed to significantly
undermine the public's ecological and recreational investment in a
resource. Even if the only focus of public property is the correction
of market failures, private users still should be required to consider
the public's investment in a resource. 226 When a nonutilitarian focus is added, the need for such consideration becomes even clearer.
Recreational and ecological uses sometimes will be conflicting. See, e.g., L. Butler & M.
Livingston, supra note 35, § 4.4, at 86-89 (discussing conflicts between public recreational
use and ecological interests).
••• Some scholars have argued that this position improperly focuses on the social costs of
private use, ignoring the beneficial externalities of private use. See H. Manne, supra note
177, at 353-54. To the extent that a private use creates instream benefits enjoyed by the
public at no cost, those benefits could be weighed against the social costs of the use to
determine whether private economic exploitation really is occurring. Indeed, if significant
instream benefits are created by private use, it seems doubtful that public use also would be
generating significant value. In other words, the existence of significant privately created
instream benefits seems to negate the possibility of publicness and thus of high publicly
created value.
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Political and Other Nonutilitarian Justifications

Several noneconomic bases support recognizing public property
rights in instream uses. One such basis focuses on the problem of
political exploitation of property, or the exploitation of resources
for political advantage in a manner inconsistent with fundamental
political rights or democratic values. To the extent that private
property rights are supposed to promote democratic values, 227 a
system of public property rights is needed to correct some of the
failures of the private rights system. 228 Though it may be difficult
to reach a consensus on when the failures exist or on what the
democratic values are, at least some of the more compelling cases
arguably are identifiable. As explained earlier, those cases would
involve political exploitation of resources vital to the public health
or welfare and resources related to fundamental political rights
and values. 229
To the extent that waterways are navigable, they clearly present
the potential for political exploitation. If the public interest in navigation were not considered a property right, private parties could
exploit the public's need for navigation, significantly curtailing access to navigable waters absent payment of appropriate extortion
fees. In addition to losing important commercial advantages, members of the public also would have their fundamental right to
travel abridged. Preservation of key democratic values thus would
require recognition of the public interest in the instream use of
navigation. 230

227
The relationship between property rights and political theory has been explored in
depth by other commentators. For some examples, see supra note 199.
••• Professor Sax seems to be making a similar argument in his famous article on the
public trust doctrine. In that article he asserts that courts should use the public trust doctrine to promote "democratization" and "equality of political power." Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471,
560-61 (1970). He identities four benchmarks for determining when public trust rights
should be recognized: (1) government disposal of public property below market value with
no obvious reason for the subsidy; (2) government action that empowers a private interest to
make resource-use decisions which could subordinate public use needs to that private interest; (3) the reallocation of diffuse public uses to private uses or to narrower public concerns;
and (4) the use of a resource for unnatural purposes. ld. at 562-65.
One philosophy scholar has argued for recognition of a constitutional right to environmen·
tal quality. Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 Yale L.J. 205, 265-67
(1974). For a critical response, see Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Structures: Learning from Nature's Future, 84 Yale L.J. 545 (1975).
••• See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text. Rose recognizes this possibility in the
context of free speech. See Rose, supra note 168, at 778-79.
230
Traditional caselaw appears to reflect this thinking. See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41
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Across-the-board recognition of other instream uses as public
property may not be consistent with the political exploitation rationale. On the surface, other instream uses do not appear to raise
the same fundamental concerns about political rights and democratic values as the navigational use. An argument probably could
be made that ecological uses are linked to democratic values. Some
might assert that, in a country based on equal opportunity, private
landowners should not control access to the rich environments of
the nation's waters-that the ecological fate of those waters should
not be in the hands of a privileged class of landowners. 231 This argument might be more convincing in a state that has added environmental provisions to its constitution. 232 But unless such a provision is effectively worded, 233 it is difficult to see how the ecological
access argument raised above really presents a problem of political
exploitation rather than a matter of environmental ethics.234
Despite the lack of a compelling argument for across-the-board
protection, instream uses other than navigation may nevertheless
merit protection under the political exploitation rationale in certain limited situations. If, for example, the environmental quality
of a vital waterbody has reached the point where it poses a serious
threat to the public health, then the political exploitation rationale
arguably would justify recognition of a public property right in the
instream use of environmental preservation. The key to such recognition would be the importance of the waterway to the public
and the severity of the threat. If either factor is compelling
enough, the failure to recognize some sort of public right could enable a private party with sufficient control over the resource to ex-

U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410-11, 414 (1842); see also Sax, supra note 228, at 484.
23
' Cf. Sagoff, supra note 228, at 265-67 (arguing that environmental quality is deeply
entrenched in our cultural tradition and therefore in our Constitution); Sax, supra note 228,
at 565 (suggesting that the "extraordinary diversity of many natural systems" might support
the recognition of public trust rights).
232
Most states have incorporated some sort of environmental provision into their constitutions, but the provisions vary significantly. See generally Butler, supra note 101, part l.B
(discussing environmental provisions in state constitutions).
233
Many of the provisions are vaguely worded, providing few explicit details to guide
courts in applying the provisions. Some courts accordingly have interpreted the provisions
as nonbinding policy statements. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 101, part I.B.l (discussing
such a decision). For alternatives to that approach, see id. part I.B.2.
234
Several commentators have similarly rejected a broad-based constitutional theory of
environmental protection. See, e.g., Tarlock, Appropriation for Instream Flow Maintenance: A Progress Report on "New" Public Western Water Rights, 1978 Utah L. Rev. 211,
216-17; Tribe, supra note 228. Some have also rejected any nonutilitarian basis for a common law right to environmental protection. See, e.g., Tarlock, supra, at 216-17.
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plait public dependence on the health of the waterway and gain
inappropriate political power. 2311 Similarly, if the ecology of a particular waterbody is unique, high public demand for the resource
could create the potential for political exploitation; private parties
in a position to control the resource could abuse the political process by exploiting public demand for the resource. 236
In addition to the political exploitation rationale, some morally
based justifications provide support for the recognition of public
property rights in instream uses. Professor Rose momentarily focuses on one of those moral rationale in developing her criteria for
inherently public property. She notes that when nonexclusive,
open-ended public use creates a property's highest value the public
deserves a right in the resource. 237 Rose's reliance on this moral
basis for recognizing public property admittedly is limited; her economic thinking tempers the development of her moral foundation,
allowing it to have weight only when it is consistent with the economic goal of promoting optimal use.
The basic moral proposition that she suggests, though, is intuitively appealing, and if applied in the public property sphere as it
has been in the private sphere, it could have fa,r-reaching consequences. For hundreds of years, philosophers have justified the existence of private property rights by arguing that a person who labors to develop a resource deserves the fruits of that labor. 238
Absent from those justifications is any requirement that the labor
produce the highest valued use. One apparent explanation for this
absence is that if a laborer does not create the highest value of a
resource, a second party who could produce that value would buy
out the first. Thus, as long as the law allows such buyouts, there is
no need to require a private user to produce the highest value; the
marketplace would automatically correct inefficiencies in use by
encouraging transfers to the efficient user. Because efficient mar1130

Some might argue that recognition of public property rights is not necessary in such a
situation because of pollution laws. This argument ignores the realities of current enforcement efforts, which often are ineffective and virtually nonexistent. For a discussion of the
inadequate implementation and enforcement structure of state environmental programs, see
Butler, supra note 101, part IV.A.
238
Rose also suggests that the uniqueness of a resource might justify public rights, but
she relies on her economic theory of inherently public property. See Rose, supra note 168,
at 781 n.329.
137
Id. at 770.
138
See, e.g., L. Becker, supra note 199, at 48-56; J. Locke, supra note 170, ch. 5; see also
Michelman, supra note 68, at 1203-05 (summarizing the various moral or desert theories
developed to justify private property rights).
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ketplace transactions are more difficult to achieve in the public
sphere, Rose may have decided to limit application of the moral
desert theory to situations where it was consistent with economic
thinking. Thus, her stipulation that the public deserves a property
right when its use creates the highest value could simply reflect her
unease over inefficiencies inherent in the public sphere.
Such a result, though appealing from an economic perspective,
ignores the basic point being made by the moral desert rationale. If
the publicness of a resource creates value, then under this rationale
the public would seem to have a moral right to that value. Because
the moral desert rationale is appealing and has gained some acceptance in the private rights system, 239 it seems both logical and
fair to extend the rationale to the public sphere at least in certain
limited situations. Among other possibilities, such an extension
could occur when the publicly created value is significant enough
and definite enough to permit identification and to make the private holdout situation possible .. Public instream uses that meet
these conditions thus should be justifiable as public property rights
under the moral desert theory.
A second moral basis for recognizing public property rights
in instream uses involves the concept of stewardship, or the notion
that man has a moral obligation to present and future generations
and to natural communities to act as a steward of the earth's
resources. 2" 0 In recent years, scholars have debated the merits and
the meaning of this proposition. 2 " 1 Though no consensus has been
reached, support for the stewardship concept is growing, as evidenced by the increase in environmental laws and in the widespread adoption of environmental provisions in state constitutions.2" 2 To the extent that the stewardship concept is accepted,243
230
Some, for example, interpret the adverse possession doctrine as reflecting a moral or
desert rationale. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 475-77 (1897). See
generally Symposium: Time, Property Rights, and the Common Law, 64 Wash. U. L.Q.
661·865 (1986) (discussing, among other topics, the policy implications of adverse
possession).
••• For a comprehensive treatment of the stewardship concept, see Symposium: Stewardship of Land and Natural Resources, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 301-668 [hereinafter cited as
Stewardship Symposium] . A draft statement of principles proposed for consideration in
writing the new Czechoslovak Constitution recognizes the stewardship concept as one of
only three obligations of the citizens of Czechoslovakia. See Czech. Statement of Principles,
supra note 199, art. V.
••• See generally Stewardship Symposium, supra note 240.
••• For a discussion of the different environmental programs now applicable in the United
States, see 1-2 Law of Environmental Protection, supra note 146. For a discussion of environmental provisions in state constitutions, see Butler, supra note 101, part LB.
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recognition of public property rights in instream uses would be one
way to fulfill the stewardship obligation.
On a related matter, some scholars have argued that environmental decisionmaking should occur through collective action to
ensure that ethically responsible choices are made. 2 " 4 Under this
position, collective action would be necessary not to meet the stewardship obligation, but rather to have morally responsible laws.
Recognizing public property rights in resources meeting Rose's criteria for inherently public property would fulfill this moral responsibility since, through the publicness of the resource, the public has
collectively, but informally, demonstrated its choice. Thus, in addition to promoting the stewardship concept, public property rights
in instream uses also would, under appropriate circumstances, ensure the development of ethical environmental laws.

V.

SoME CoNCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE EvoLUTION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL WATER RIGHTS

In recent years, the legal system has developed a number of devices for protecting the public interest in instream use. Though the
devices vary significantly in form and in content, they collectively
represent an important evolutionary trend: the legitimation of
public rights in instream water use. But while the current devices
represent an important political and environmental victory, they
generally fail to provide a principled or coherent way to define the
relationship between newly recognized public rights and traditional
private interests. Because the current forms of instream protection
alter the scope of private water rights, that relationship will become increasingly important as the demand for water resources
rises. For the instream protection movement to be complete, then,
the evolutionary process must achieve the integration of public and
private water rights. A principled way of resolving conflicts between emerging public interests and established private rights is
needed to ensure the long-term acceptance and effectiveness of
public environmental water rights. The public property concept
A discussion of the merits of the stewardship concept is beyond the scope of this article. For a good discussion of the different arguments and for an ethical justification of environmental decisionmaking, see Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 337.
2
See, e.g., H. Rolston, III, Environmental Ethics 246-48 (1988); see also Farber, supra
"
note 243, at 354-60 (arguing for environmental decisionmaking by social democracy or majority rule).
. .3
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can provide such a principled approach.
Utilitarian principles suggest that lawmakers need to realize the
wisdom of complementing private water rights systems with public
property rights in instream use. Though economic theory normally
supports private property rights, utilitarian principles nevertheless
justify recognition of public instream rights when two conditions
exist: one, an instream use is susceptible to the private holdout
problem and, two, public instream use would generate either the
highest value of the property or at least a significant value that is
reasonably identifiable and definite. Because waterways are vital
resources having a relatively confined location, they are precisely
the type of resource that generally satisfies these two conditions.
Whether a particular instream use similarly satisfies the two criteria will depend on the nature of the use.
The likelihood and severity of the private holdout problem, for
example, will vary according to the use. While virtually all navigational uses present a compelling case for private exploitation, recreational uses raise much weaker grounds for concern. Only defined areas of established recreational importance to the public
would appear to merit consideration under the private holdout
test. While ecological uses present similar problems under the
holdout criterion, the magnitude of these problems will depend, to
an extent, on the nature of the environmental interest at stake.
Whereas preservation of particular ecological habitats or wildlife
communities may require site-specific determinations of private
holdout potential, protection of water quality may enjoy a broader
approach. Because the qualitative health of a watercourse is dependent on land use activities occurring within its watershed, 2 " 11
waterfront landowners have the power to control the health of the
resource and therefore to exploit public dependence on water quality. In any event, even when an ecological use is site-specific, recognition of public rights in that use may require instream protection
for the entire stream.
Satisfaction of the value criterion also depends on the nature of
the use. Public navigational uses, with their link to commerce,
clearly result in increasing returns to scale and thus in the highest
valued use. The comparative values of public recreational and eco-

... The waters of the Chesapeake Bay, for example, are affected by farming practices oc·
curring throughout the Bay's extensive watershed. See generally L. Butler & M. Livingston,
supra note 35, §§ 3.1.A, 3.2.A, 3.3 (discussing the physical characteristics of the Bay and the
geological and chemical processes affecting those characteristics).
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logical uses are not as easy to determine. Because of the socialization effects of recreational and ecological uses, greater public involvement should produce increasing value, especially in the
context of ecological use. As the public commitment to ecological
water use grows, the value of public participation will increase; environmental protection efforts simply do not work well without significant public support. But whether that use is the highest valued
use is not clear due in part to the difficulty of measuring publicly
created value and to the speculativeness of the valuation process.
What is clear is that the value created by public ecological water
use will be significant enough to entice private parties to reap the
benefits of the use. If the amount recaptured is large, public efforts
to further ecological purposes will be seriously undermined. Thus,
even if the publicly created value is not the highest value, a significant public investment will be misdirected absent recognition of
public property rights.
The inability of public recreational and ecological water uses to
clearly produce the highest value would be enough to convince
some of the inadvisability of recognizing public property rights in
those uses. This position ignores not only the difficulty of making
value comparisons in the public and the environmental contexts,
but also the existence of other value systems. 246 Besides economic
theory, political and ethical theories also serve as important
sources of societal values. The public interest in navigation, for example, has long been accepted as an integral part of our political
structure. Freedom to travel and prosper would mean little to
those dependent on the nation's waterways if the waterways were
monopolized by a select few. Nonnavigational environmental water
uses pose a much weaker case for political recognition of public
property rights; the public interest in those uses would implicate
fundamental political values only in rare situations. Recreational
and ecological uses, however, fare better under theories of morality
and ethics. Notions of just desert and stewardship are intricately
connected to these types of public environmental water use, especially ecological water use. Large-scale public efforts to preserve
the environment of water resources for recreational and ecological
purposes can generate significant value. 247 Unless the public
..a For a more thorough discussion of the need to consider noneconomic values in environmental decisionmaking, see Farber, supra note 243.
••• See generally L. Butler & M. Livingston, supra note 35, ch. 4 (discussing the value
and impact of man's use of Virginia's coastal resources).
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reaches a consensus that the only important value system is economic theory, the public deserves to recoup some of the value that
it creates.
Growing acceptance of the stewardship concept suggests that
such a consensus has not been reached. Indeed, if any value system
is emerging in the area of resource management, it is the notion
that man owes some sort of obligation to the present and future
inhabitants of the earth. While proving the emergence of this system admittedly is difficult, evidence of its development can be
found worldwide in all walks of life: 248 in the expanding scope of
environmental laws, in the increasingly aggressive enforcement efforts of environmental regulators, 249 in the growing international
movement for environmental quality, 2110 in the surprising adoption
of resource management programs by environmentally conservative jurisdictions,2111 in the public outrage over serious environmental accidents, and in the efforts of some Eastern Europeans to
make environmental quality a constitutional value. 2112 Finally, it
can be seen in the trust that the American people place, perhaps
naively, in their government to provide the fundamentals of environmental quality-clean air and water. In the end, _then, the public interest in environmental water use becomes a matter of trust.
For years the American people have taken their natural resources
for granted, in part because of their abundance but also because of
the faith that the people have put in their government to implement federal environmental law and properly manage the nation's
resources. If this trust is not enough to justify recognition of public

••• Cf. Farber, supra note 243, at 354-58 (discussing the need for social democracy and
ways to define public opinion).
249
For examples of these enforcement efforts, see Bender, Farming Family Loses Wet·
lands Violation Suit, Daily Press, Jan. 27, 1990, at C1, col. 5 (discussing precedent-setting
wetlands violation suit), and Washington Post, Jan. 17, 1990, at A2, col. 5 (discussing recent
appellate decision upholding conviction and jail sentence for unauthorized wetlands filling).
••• In 1987, for example, a number of countries signed the first international treaty on air
quality. See Note, An Attempt to Stop the Sky from Falling: The Montreal Protocol to
Protect Against Atmospheric Ozone Reduction, 15 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 391 , 393
(1989); see also Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 1416, 1987, U.N. Environment Programme. See generally 1985 Council on Environmental
Quality Ann. Rep. chs. 5-13 (discussing international environmental problems); 1981 Council on Environmental Quality Ann. Rep. ch. 8 (discussing the global environment).
'"' See, e.g., Chesapeake Executive Council, The First Progress Report Under the 1987
Chesapeake Bay Agreement 1-11 (Jan. 1989) (where the traditionally conservative state of
Virginia joined other jurisdictions in executing a management program for the Chesapeake
Bay).
••• See Czech. Statement of Principles, supra note 199, art. V.
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environmental water rights, then our system of democratic decisionmaking is fundamentally flawed.

